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1 Abstract 
This thesis presents three neuropsychological experiments in the context of subjective 
valuation of rewards. In all experiments healthy human subjects played a similar 
wheel-of-fortune game, where they could obtain rewards differing in the subjectively 
perceived value. Neuronal activity was registered while subjects anticipated rewards 
and evaluated feedback about outcomes using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG).  
In Experiment 1 the subjective reward value was operationalized as chocolate bars of 
differently preferred brands. The individual preferences of each subject were 
correlated with fMRI activity, indicating those areas of the brain sensitively 
responding to subjective value of rewards. 
In Experiment 2 subjects played a modified wheel-of-fortune game for differently 
preferred vouchers for a pair of sneakers of a specific brand. Besides investigating 
fMRI activations throughout the whole brain, temporal runs of hemodynamic 
responses in the ventral striatum were examined in comparison to well-known single 
cell spiking patterns in midbrain dopamine neurons of monkeys.  
In Experiment 3, reward value was modulated, using monetary rewards. In contrast 
to behaviourally assessed subjective reward value in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
the subjective reward value of money was estimated by means of electrophysiological 
measures. In addition, Experiment 3 provided new insights in the temporal dynamics 
of reward outcome processing taking a data-driven analysis approach. 
This thesis therefore explored the neuronal processing of subjective reward value at 
different scales, ranging from contextual influences such as the influence of brands on 
valuation to very basal mechanisms of reward coding in the ventral striatum. In 
addition, using the neuroimaging methods of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) in a complementary fashion we were able 
to explore anatomical as well as temporal characteristics of reward value processing.  
 
In dieser Dissertation werden drei Experimente vorgestellt, welche die 
neuropsychologischen Grundlagen von subjektivem Wert explorieren. Den 
Experimenten ist gemein, dass die Versuchpersonen ein Glückspiel spielten, bei dem 
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sie Objekte gewinnen konnten, welche sich im subjektiven Wert unterschieden. 
Hierbei wurde neuronale Aktivität mittels funktioneller Magnetresonanz 
Tomographie (fMRT) und Elektroenzephallographie aufgezeichnet, zum einen 
während der Erwartung auf einen potentiellen Gewinn und nachdem Rückmeldung 
über den Ausgang des Spiels gegeben wurde.  
In Experiment 1 wurde subjektiver Wert in Form unterschiedlich präferierter 
Schokolademarken operationalisiert. Die individuelle Präferenz wurde mit fMRT-
Aktivität korreliert. So konnte eruiert werden welche Hirnareale subjektiven Wert 
verarbeiten.  
In Experiment 2 spielten Versuchspersonen eine modifizierte Version des 
Glückspielparadigmas von Experiment 1. Es konnten unterschiedlich präferierte 
Gutscheine für Turnschuhe gewonnen werden. Neben fMRT-Ganzkopfanalysen 
wurden hämodynamische Antwortmuster im ventralen Striatum mit den Resultaten 
aus früheren Einzelzell-Studien bei Affen verglichen. 
In Experiment 3 wurde subjektiver Wert durch Geldwert moduliert. Im unterschied zu 
verhaltenstechnisch erfassten subjektiven Belohnungswerten in Experiment 1 und 
Experiment 2 wurde der subjektive Wert von Geld mittels EEG ermittelt. Der neue 
daten-getriebene Analyse-Ansatz lieferte neue Erkenntnisse über die zeitliche 
Verarbeitung von Belohnungsreizen.  
Zusammengefasst thematisiert diese Dissertationsarbeit die neuronale Verarbeitung 
von Belohnungswerten auf verschiedenen Ebenen. Diese reichen von kontextuellen 
Einflüssen von Marken auf die Bewertung von Objekten bis zur Beschreibung sehr 
basaler Verarbeitungsmechanismen im ventralen Striatum. Die komplementäre 
Kombination von fMRT und EEG ermöglichte es anatomische und zeitliche Aspekte 
der Verarbeitung von Belohnungsgrösse zu untersuchen.  
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2  Summary 
 
As every day experience demonstrates, brands have the power to modulate the 
subjectively perceived value of objects. Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 tested 
whether it is possible to depict brand-dependent subjective preferences of objectively 
similar (with respect to monetary value) products by means of fMRI activity in 
reward-related areas in the human brain. For this purpose, subjects played a virtual 
wheel-of-fortune game in the MRI-scanner, where they could win differently 
preferred branded objects (chocolate bars in experiment 1 and sneakers in experiment 
2).  
Results of both experiments indicated that while anticipating a desired object, 
hemodynamic responses in the premotor cortex, the anterior insula / later orbitofrontal 
cortex and the midbrain were scaled with respect to the specific preference. Only in 
Experiment 2 the ventral striatum revealed brand-preference related increases in 
neuronal activity. This difference is likely due to modifications in the reward scheme, 
highlighting the sensitivity of fMRI results with respect to modifications in the 
experimental taks. In summary, the identified preference-sensitive structures represent 
a network, which is involved in emotional processing and the initiation of goal-
oriented behaviour. This finding also supports the ascribed motivational, action-
relevant characteristics of brands. 
After subjects were informed about the outcome of the wheel-of-fortune game 
neuronal activity in the ventral pallidum, caudate nucleus, precuneus, lingual gyrus 
and in the cerebellum was scaled in dependency of preference. However, these 
findings were specific to Experiment 1. In Experiment 2 mainly structures in the 
prefrontal cortex exhibited preference-dependent activity. Again, the incongruity of 
these results is likely due to differences in the reward schemes.  
In summary, we could validate that differences in the preference for an object, solely 
due to branding are sufficient to evoke differentiable hemodynamic responses in 
reward related structures of the brain. In addition, dissociation between anticipatory 
and evaluative aspects of rewards was demonstrated at a neuronal level. Finally, 
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Experiment 2 served as a replication with slight modifications in the experimental 
paradigm and reward category. This made it possible to generalize the findings of 
Experiment 1 to non-food products, but also provided important practical knowledge 
about the reliability and sensitivity of fMRI with regards to reward studies.  
The second part of Experiment 2 explored the characteristics of the hemodynamic 
response patterns in the ventral striatum using a different analysis approach. Ventral 
striatal activity in humans and dopaminergic midbrain activity measured with 
electrophysiological methods in monkeys are largely congruent with respect to the 
processing of many aspects of rewards. This led to the hypothesis that ventral striatal 
activity may be largely influenced by activity in dopaminergic midbrain structures. 
Since activity in the dopaminergic midbrain is difficult to measure by means of fMRI 
we compare single cell firing patterns of monkeys of a recent study with similar 
experimental design to hemodynamic response patterns in the ventral striatum 
measured in Experiment 2. Comparing single cell spiking patterns with fMRI 
responses provided new knowledge about the functional relation between midbrain 
dopamine neurons and the ventral striatum.  
Results indicated that hemodynamic responses in the ventral striatum largely followed 
the predictions of dopaminergic midbrain responses. Contrasting the findings of 
single cell studies, hemodynamic responses in the ventral striatum upon reward 
omission gradually decreased in a reward magnitude-dependent fashion. To further 
explore this unexpected effect we identified the modulatory sources of the graded 
decrease using a psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI), which recognized the 
dorsal raphe nucleus, a cluster in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior 
cingulate cortex as changing their connectivity with the ventral striatum. This 
indicates, that neuronal activity in the ventral striatum upon reward omission is 
influenced through serotonergic input of the dorsal raphe nucleus as well as input of 
the lateral orbitofrontal cortex.  
Experiment 3 focussed on the evaluation of rewarding outcomes. To complement on 
the previous studies a similar experiment as was conducted while registering scalp 
electroencephalographic signals (EEG). Subjects played a wheel-of-fortune game for 
different amounts of money ranging from 10 Swiss centimes to 1 Swiss franc in 
decrements of 10 centimes.  
We developed a new analytical method permitting to estimate non-linear monetary 
reward value functions that can be covaried with event related potential (ERP) 
 
9 
topographies. To our knowledge, these value functions represent the first attempt to 
identify an electrophysiological correlate of experienced utility, which has been 
largely neglected in empirical economical research. Finally, the introduced framework 
of analysis potentially enlarges the scope of ERP studies by accounting for the 
inherent properties of high-density EEG datasets as well as continuously scaled   
(non-)linear external variables.  
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3 Introduction 
With the advent of information age, many parallels have been drawn between human 
brains and computers. To some degree, that may be operationally accurate. But in 
contrast to a human brain, a computer has no internal goals. We have to tell the 
computer what to achieve. For humans as for any living organism survival and 
reproduction constitute the prime goals. To successfully follow these goals we need to 
obtain and avoid objects in our environment. To make these decisions, the human 
brain provides mechanisms to encode and evaluate the rewarding values of objects.  
Physiological studies and neuroimaging studies in the last decade have shown that 
there is a common nominator of brain structures evaluating both, primary reinforcers, 
like food and secondary reinforcers, like money and higher order rewards as novelty, 
cognitive and social rewards. Consistently, these types of rewards engage activity in a 
neuronal circuitry commonly referred to as the “reward system”. More specifically the 
neural structures within this network respond sensitively to the value and the 
probability of occurrence of a reward. This feature of the brain enables to rank 
different options to form preferences and thus constitutes the basis of choice- or more 
generally goal-oriented behaviour.   
One important question in the field of research on reward processing and decision-
making is how reward values and preferences are neurally processed. So far, many 
studies have investigated the neuronal correlates of reward-value coding using 
electrophysiological and functional brain imaging techniques. However, only few 
studies investigated the processing of reward value at a subjective level. This thesis 
complements on previous work. Specifically, in one part, it investigates the effect of 
modulating the individually perceived value of objects through branding by 
conducting two functional magnetic resonance imaging studies (fMRI). In addition, 
this thesis compares single cell recordings in non-human primates and fMRI 
responses in humans in order to gain knowledge about the interplay of neuronal core 
structures in the reward system. In a second part, it presents an 
electroencephalography (EEG) study. This study provides the basis to render reward 
value as a function of EEG-activity, providing a psychophysiological measure of 
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experienced utlity. In the context of this study an analytical framework is presented, 
which is the first to account for non-linear relationships between external variables 
and EEG measures incorporating the inherent full spatio-temporal resolution.  
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4 The neural basis of reward processing 
4.1 Neuroanatomy of the reward system 
The most important structures involved in the processing of reward information are 
the ventral tegmental area (VTA), the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), the 
nucleus accumbens (NACC) together with adjacent parts of the caudate nucleus and 
ventral portions of the putamen forming the ventral striatum (VS). Many areas of the 
brain interact with these “core” structures, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) as well as the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC). 
 
The core structures of the reward system are sited along dopaminergic pathways 
arising in the midbrain. These pathways project via the limbic cortex to the neocortex. 
Three major pathways can be distinguished (Abler et al., 2005, Roth and Dicke, 
2005): 
! The mesotriatal pathway has its origin in the SNc and the VTA and projects 
to the dorsolateral hypothalamus and the striatum including the NACC.  
! The mesolimbic pathway includes projections originating in the VTA and the 
medial SNc reaching the bulbus olfactorius, the amygdala, the hippocampus 
and the NACC. 
! The mesocortical pathway includes neural projections from the VTA and 
SNc to the prefrontal cortex including the OFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), and the ACC. 
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Figure 1: Schematic view of the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopaminergic 
pathways. (Abler et al., 2005) 
 
Besides this anatomical classification the increasing number of neuroimaging studies 
in humans and physiological studies in non-human primates suggest a core reward 
network from a functional point of view; the cortico-basal-ganglia network. It 
includes the prefrontal cortex, the entire VS, and the dopamine neurons of the 
midbrain (Haber and Knutson, 2009). The VS receives its main cortical input from the 
OFC and ACC and massive dopaminergic input from the midbrain. The VS projects 
to the ventral pallidum (VP) and to the VTA/SN, which in turn project back to the 
prefrontal cortex, via the medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus. In addition, other 
structures including the amygdala, hippocampus, lateral habenular nucleus and 
specific brainstem structures, such as the dorsal raphe nucleus regulate the reward 
circuit (Haber and Knutson, 2009).  
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4.1.1 Prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex 
Neurons throughout the whole prefrontal cortex of primates respond to rewarding 
stimuli. However, the most important cortical areas to name are the OFC and the 
ACC. The OFC encompasses Brodmann areas 11, 12, 13, and 14. It is further 
distinguished between lateral parts of the OFC and medial portions. The ACC covers 
Brodmann areas 24, 25, and 32 and is subdivided into the dorsal ACC and the 
subgenual ACC, often also referred to as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
(Haber and Knutson, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 2. Subdivision of the prefrontal cortex. 
 
Human fMRI and PET studies indicate that various types of rewards recruit activity in 
the prefrontal cortex. For example it was shown that exposure to primary and 
secondary rewards consistently increases hemodynamic responses throughout the 
prefrontal cortex, but convergingly in the VMPFC (Aharon et al., 2001; Blood and 
Zatorre, 2001; Elliott et al., 2000; JO'Doherty et al., 2001; Knutson, 2000; Small et 
al., 2001). In addition to the VMPFC, the ACC as well as the dorsal prefrontal cortex 
seem to be consistently involved in reward processing. 
As proposed by human lesion data (Bechara et al., 1994) and several neuroimaging 
studies activity in the OFC is related to the processing of information about abstract as 
well as sensory rewards. A recent meta analysis (Kringelbach, 2005) suggests that 
posterior portions of the OFC tend to respond to sensory rewards (e.g. food), whereas 
abstract rewards (e.g. money) tend to induce activity in the anterior OFC.  In addition, 
O'Doherty et al. (2001) conjectures that lateral regions of the OFC are recruited, when 
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events are punishing to inhibit ongoing motor responses, whereas medial parts of the 
OFC respond to positive events.   
The adjacent VMPFC has been implicated in the processing of contextual aspect 
during the anticipation of rewards. For example, Knutson and Peterson (2005) have 
shown that VMPFC activity not only correlates with the magnitude of anticipated 
rewards but also with the probability of occurrence of an anticipated reward. 
Furthermore, in the context of financial risk taking the weighting of benefits vs. cost 
is associated with activity in the VMPFC (Knutson and Peterson, 2005; Preuschoff et 
al., 2006). In summary the VMPFC is conjectured to play a key role in integrating 
reward value across different stimulus dimensions, possibly through close interplay 
with the insula and the VS.  
The ACC and the dorsal PFC are also involved in reward processing, but activity in 
these regions is possibly not directly related to valuation. The ACC can be viewed as 
structure with integrative functions, combining and processing affective, cognitive 
and motor functions. This integrative aspect of the ACC is in line with the widespread 
connections to other affective, cognitive and motor areas. With regards to reward 
processing, the ACC plays a dominant role in the processing of errors. More 
specifically, the ACC receives input from dopaminergic sites such as the NACC and 
the VTA and is suggested to integrate reward specific signals to adapt behavioural 
responses. For example, the consideration of options that conflict on different 
dimensions, like the price and the preference for an object elicits increased activation 
in the ACC (Knutson et al., 2007). 
4.1.2 Ventral striatum 
The ventral striatum, first conceptualized by Heimer (1978) includes the NACC and 
the broad continuity between the caudate nucleus and the putamen ventral to the 
rostral internal capsule, the olfactory tubercle, and the rostrolateral portion of the 
anterior perforated space adjacent to the lateral olfactory tract (Haber and McFarland, 
1999). The boundaries between the VS and dorsal striatum are not well defined in 
terms of cytoarchitectony or histochemistry. Instead, Haber and Knutson (2009) 
suggest to define the VS as the area within the striatum with afferent projections from 
reward related structures, namely the VMPFC, OFC, ACC and the medial temporal 
lobe, including the amygdala.  
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Figure 3. Anatomical distinction between ventral and dorsal striatum. (adapted from 
Mawlawi et al, 2001) 
 
4.1.2.1 Afferent connections 
The whole striatum receives cortical projection organized in a functional topographic 
manner (Parent et al., 1997). The dorsolateral striatum receives mainly inputs from 
sensory-motor areas, the central striatum from associative cortices; and the VS is 
mainly targeted by limbic structures. More specifically, the VS receives a great 
proportion of glutamatergic input from the cerebral cortex and the thalamus and to a 
lesser but important proportion, dopaminergic input from the midbrain, primarily 
from the VTA and SNc (Haber and Knutson, 2009). 
4.1.2.2 Efferent connections  
The VS primarily projects to the pallidum and the midbrain with the densest terminal 
fields in the VTA and SN (Parent et al., 1997). In addition, the VS also sends 
projections to non-basal-ganglia structures, such as the lateral hypothalamus and the 
periaqueductal grey (Haber et al., 1990). In addition, axons from the medial VS 
terminate in the amygdala and the nucleus basalis. The nucleus basalis in turn is the 
main source of cholinergic fibers to the cerebral cortex, suggesting that the VS may 
directly influence the cortex, without going through the pallidal and thalamic circuit 
(Haber and Knutson, 2009). 
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4.1.2.3 Functions of the VS 
As outlined above, the VS takes a central role within the network of reward related 
structures in the brain, integrating emotional/affective information from limbic 
structures and higher cognitive information to modulate motor functions. In various 
fMRI and PET studies it has been shown that activation of the VS increases after 
exposure to primary rewards (e.g. pleasant tastes and sounds) as well as secondary 
rewards (e.g. monetary rewards) (Blood and Zatorre, 2001; Kunig et al., 2000; Small 
et al., 2001), indicating that VS activation is independent of the sensory modality of 
the reward. A line of research has suggested, that VS activity is mainly due to arousal 
and that not necessarily the most rewarding stimuli elicit increased hemodynamic 
responses in the VS, but the most salient stimuli (Zink et al., 2006; Zink et al., 2004). 
However, the omission of an unexpected reward - which is at least as salient as an 
unexpected delivery of a reward - produces deactivations in the VS (Knutson et al., 
2001a). Therefore, it is conceivable that VS activity is not merely reflecting stimulus 
saliency, but a compound of reward coding and stimulus saliency coding.  
Positive and arousing affective experience is linked to VS activity. For example, 
ligand-based PET studies have implicated, that after amphetamine injection, or 
consumption of alcohol and cocaine striatal dopamine concentration increases. These 
increases have been shown to correlate with self-reports of arousal and hedonic 
experience (Cox et al., 2009; Drevets et al., 2001). Also secondary reinforcers such as 
playing video games and gambling may also increase dopamine release in the VS 
(Koepp et al., 1998; Zald et al., 2004). 
Besides pure effects of exposure of rewarding stimuli inducing VS activation, a long 
line of research has conjectured, that many dimensions of rewards, such as reward 
magnitude, probability, uncertainty, and delay, modulate VS activity. fMRI studies 
have shown, that VS activity increases proportionally to the magnitude of anticipated 
rewards (Knutson et al., 2001b; Yacubian et al., 2006). Depth-electrode recordings of 
epileptic patients in the NACC, indicate a similar effect (Cohen et al., 2009). The 
probability to obtain a reward relates to uncertainty: High or low probabilities impose 
small uncertainty, whereas moderate ranges of probability imply maximal uncertainty. 
With regards to uncertainty and probability there is no consensus on the influence of 
VS activation. Some studies report linear effects of anticipated reward probability on 
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VS activity (Abler et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2008; Yacubian et al., 
2006) others studies find that the VS is maximally activated with maximal uncertainty 
(Cooper and Knutson, 2008; Dreher et al., 2006).  
Another contextual effect influencing VS activity is the delay between the cue for a 
reward and the time point where it is obtained. People tend to discount rewards, which 
are obtained in the far future compared to immediate rewards. fMRI studies have 
pointed out that VS activity increased when immediate vs. delayed rewards were 
subjected and decreased with the delay of future rewards (Kable and Glimcher, 2007).  
In addition to the above-described effects on VS activity for anticipated rewards, 
subcomponents within the VS also respond to rewarding outcomes. Results of several 
studies suggest that hemodynamic responses in the medial caudate portion of the VS 
are associated with rewarding outcomes (Delgado et al., 2000; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2005) (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). Opposing to increased activation of the medial 
caudate, several studies have reported decreased hemodynamic responses in the VS to 
the omission of rewards (Berns et al., 2001; Ramnani et al., 2004). Also in the context 
of reinforcement learning it was shown with computational modelling techniques that 
the VS tracks the difference between expected and obtained rewards (prediction error) 
(McClure et al., 2003a; McClure et al., 2003b; O'Doherty et al., 2003). However, VS 
activity is less consistently observed to reward outcomes as reward anticipation, 
which is possibly due to the low temporal resolution of fMRI. It is possible that the 
hemodynamic responses to reward anticipation (a necessary prerequisite for 
outcomes) wash into the phase of reward outcome and are therefore hardly separable 
with fMRI.       
4.1.3 Midbrain Dopamine Neurons 
The midbrain dopamine neurons are classically divided into the substantia nigra pars 
compacta (SNc), the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and retrorubral cell groups (Haber 
and Knutson, 2009). The SNc is sited in between the ventral and lateral superior 
cerebellar peduncle and the red nucleus, forming a band with the VTA.  
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Figure 4. Left panel: Localization of midbrain dopamine nuclei with proton density 
weighted MRI. The substantia nigra pars compacta (orange) is located in the lateral 
portions of the midbrain between the cerebral peduncle and the red nuclei. The 
ventral tegmental area (green) is located in between the substantia nigra pars 
compacta. (Adapted from D’Ardenne et al., 2008). 
 
4.1.3.1 Afferent projections 
Midbrain dopamine neurons receive mainly inputs from the striatum and brainstem 
regions. In addition, the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis and the sublenticular 
substantia innominata and the extended amygdala send projections to midbrain 
dopamine cells.  Furthermore, glutamatergic input comes from the pedunculopontine 
nucleus as well as serotonergic input from the dorsal raphe nucleus (Lavoie and 
Parent, 1994). Interestingly, dopaminergic midbrain neurons are also connected to the 
superior colliculus, suggesting a direct sensory input (May et al., 2009). Finally, there 
is a small proportion of afferents from the PFC, terminating in the VTA and SNc 
(Haber and Knutson, 2009). 
4.1.3.2 Efferent projections 
Vice versa to striatal input to dopamine midbrain neurons the main proportion of the 
output of midbrain dopamine neurons target the striatum (Haber and Knutson, 2009). 
The projections to the striatum are topographically arranged: Ventral SNc neurons 
project to the dorsal striatum, whereas the VTA primarily projects to the VS in 
particular to the NACC.  
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4.1.3.3 The Functions of midbrain dopamine neurons 
Various electrophysiological studies have shown, that the firing rates of midbrain 
dopamine neurons in monkeys are altered through the prediction of rewards and 
reward prediction error (Schultz, 2000). Nowadays, improved spatial resolution and 
newly developed scanning procedures enable to visualize hemodynamic changes in 
midbrain structures. Although, there are only a limited number of fMRI studies in 
humans investigating dopaminergic midbrain activity, results suggest that, similarly 
as in single cell recordings, activity increases during the anticipation of rewards (e.g. 
pleasant tastes) (D'Ardenne et al., 2008; O'Doherty et al., 2002). Yet, there is no study 
investigating effects of reward prediction errors in the dopaminergic midbrain in 
humans. 
The before discussed structures of the reward system are by far not the only ones 
involved in reward processing but are regarded as the key reward structures. Reward 
processing involves not only the extraction of reward related information of a 
stimulus. In addition, what counts as a reward and how it is approached has to be 
learned. Therefore reward processing implies a complex integration between 
motivational, cognitive-strategic and motor-processes. Thus, depending on the 
specific task, almost any structure in the human brain may be involved in reward 
processing.  
4.2 The dopamine reward prediction error (DRPE) model  
The dopamine reward prediction error model is based on series of seminal studies of 
the workgroup around Wolfram Schultz. Schultz and colleagues investigated single 
cell responses in the dopaminergic midbrain of non-human primates in the context of 
classical and operant conditioning. The first studies indicated, that a large proportion 
of neurons in the VTA and SNc show phasic increases in firing rates when monkeys 
are exposed to unexpected primary rewards, like a sip of sweet liquid. These phasic 
bursts were followed by a postsynaptic release of dopamine (Schultz et al., 1992). 
Intriguingly, the same neurons exhibited a different response pattern after monkeys 
have learned that a stimulus cues a forthcoming reward: The phasic response was 
shifted from the time-point of the reward to the time-point of the cue. In addition, 
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when a cued reward was unexpectedly omitted, dopaminergic neurons showed a 
phasic decrease in spiking below the baseline-firing rate. A study of Tobler et al., 
 (2003) showed, that dopaminergic neurons exhibit the same phasic increase in 
spiking when a cue signalling the omission of a reward is unexpectedly followed by a 
reward. This supports the hypothesis that dopaminergic neurons encode rewards in 
relation to the expectancy. It was suggested that such a mechanism is suitable for 
reinforcement learning. For example, if an action that is expected to result in a 
rewarding consequence is not followed by a reward, the expectation for the outcome 
of a subsequent identical action is updated (lowered in this case). Therefore, if one 
knows about the contingencies between action and outcomes, no further learning has 
to be made. Whereas, to behave optimally when confronted with a new situation the 
action-outcome relation has to be first established. Astonishingly, the dopamine 
reward prediction error (DRPE) model follows the rules of a beforehand-developed 
computational learning model termed temporal difference (TD) learning by Sutton 
and Barto (1990). Specifically, it was shown, that the firing rate of dopamine neurons 
in the VTA and SNc mimic the error function in the TD-algorithm (Schultz et al., 
1997). 
The firing patterns of dopaminergic midbrain neurons are not an all or nothing 
response, but are scaled to different variables of reward, like the magnitude, the 
probability and the uncertainty. As outlined before, neurons in the VTA and SNc 
increase their firing rate, when a cue predicts a forthcoming reward. Furthermore, the 
frequency in spiking is correlated to the magnitude / value and expected probability of 
a reward (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). It was suggested, that the reward-
predicting signal might correspond to the economical construct of expected value (see 
chapter 3.3.1). In contrast to phasic responses, coding value and probability, tonic 
increases in dopaminergic spiking seem to encode uncertainty (maximal firing rates at 
50% chance for a reward). 
Similarly, as neuronal responses to the expectation of a reward, neuronal spiking in 
response to reward prediction errors (e.g. responses to the exposure of rewards) 
exhibits very specific patterns. When rewarding cues provide explicit information 
about putative forthcoming rewards of different magnitudes, firing patterns 
representing the reward prediction error appear to normalize to the standard deviation 
of the reward prediction error. For example a single cell monkey study showed, that, 
when three cues predicted pairs of rewards of different magnitudes with equiprobable 
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chances of gain, the better outcome always elicited the same positive reward 
prediction error signal, irrespective of reward magnitude. The same holds for the 
negative outcomes, which were followed by the same negative reward prediction error 
signal. As a consequence of this “gain adaptation”, the neural responses appear to 
discriminate between two potential outcomes equally well, regardless of their absolute 
magnitude differences. Therefore, the dopaminergic system can adapt its sensitivity to 
a wide range of reward magnitudes (Tobler et al., 2005). 
The delineated response characteristics of midbrain dopamine neurons demonstrate, 
that there is a neuronal signal that breaks down many aspects of reward related 
information to a common integrated signal. Dopamine neurons, therefore integrate 
reward related information, extracted and processed in the PFC, VS, ventral pallidum, 
amygdala, hypothalamus etc. and initiate further processing involved in learning, 
motivation and executive function.  
The work on dopamine neurons in monkeys has also inspired research using EEG in 
humans. Researchers have identified event related potential (ERP) modulations called 
the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the error-related negativity (ERN) that 
have been suggested to reflect a reward prediction error signal, which shares many 
characteristics as reward prediction error signals found in midbrain dopamine neurons 
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002, Cohen et al., 2007, Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2004). It has been 
proposed that the FRN reflects the effect of midbrain dopamine signals. This 
conjecture is supported by animal work, demonstrating that midbrain dopamine 
neurons project to and modulate activity in pyramidal cells in the cingulate cortex 
(Onn and Wang, 2005). However, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was also shown 
to modulate activity of midbrain dopamine neurons (Gao et al., 2007). 
In addition to research with EEG, the discovery that the activity of dopamine neurons 
bears a striking similarity to prediction error terms in computational theories of 
learning has also influenced the domain of fMRI research on humans. Computational 
reinforcement-learning models have been used to model reward prediction error 
related hemodynamic responses on a trial-by-trial basis. Often, such modelled reward 
prediction error regressors exhibit significant correlations with hemodynamic 
responses in the striatum and frontal cortex (Braver & Brown, 2003; McClure et al., 
2003a; O’Doherty et al., 2003). They are interpreted as reward prediction errors, 
which have been signaled from midbrain dopamine neurons.  
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4.3 Neural basis of reward anticipation and outcome evaluation of rewards in 
humans 
Compared to PET, event related fMRI offers a distinction (in the range of seconds) 
between phases of neuronal processing. Therefore, the majority of neuroimaging 
studies focussing on reward anticipation and reward outcome processing were 
conducted with fMRI. In general, a gambling task, such as a roulette game is the most 
commonly applied experimental paradigm to investigate the neural bases of reward 
processing, because different variables, such as reward magnitude, and reward 
probability can be easily varied and it is possible to play for a large amount of 
repetitions. Breiter et al., (2001) were among the first who investigated hemodynamic 
response to varying amounts of monetary rewards. Their results suggested strong 
involvement of the Amygdala and OFC during the anticipation of a reward and the 
sublenticular extended amygdala (SLEA), the Nucleus accumbens (NACC) and the 
hypothalamus showing a scaled neural response in correspondence with the value of 
received monetary gain. In line, Galvan et al., (2005) report OFC activation during the 
anticipation of monetary rewards, but in combination with increased hemodynamic 
responses in the NACC and Thalamus. In another study, Knutson et al., (2001b) 
found that the ventral striatum (incl. NACC) was strongly active during the 
anticipation of monetary reward, the mesial prefrontal cortex (PFC), the parietal 
cortex and the posterior cingulum were active following feedback to the participants 
of having successfully obtained a reward. During reward anticipation, the NACC 
activity was positively correlated with the magnitude of the monetary reward and the 
subjects reported positive affect. Further, studies support the idea that the NACC 
activity represents the value of positive incentives (Ernst et al., 2005; Gottfried et al., 
2003; Knutson et al., 2001a). Besides, the NACC and the OFC in few studies it was 
shown, that the anterior insula and the amygdala is sensitive to the magnitude of 
rewards (Smith et al., 2009).  
Different structures, than in the anticipation of a reward have been found to be 
responsive to the magnitude of rewarding outcomes. Many studies consistently 
identified the VMPFC and the ACC among others, like the OFC and premotor areas 
(Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001b; Knutson et al., 2003; Rolls et al., 2008).  
The VMPFC is thought to modify outcome-related appetitive impulses in goal-
directed behavior (Knutson et al., 2003). In the context of reward processing many 
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studies have shown, that the ACC is activated, when outcomes are worse than 
expected, which is in line with its ascribed role in conflict monitoring. The OFC on 
the other hand, harbors representation of reinforcement values (Rolls, 2004). 
Furthermore, fMRI studies have revealed correlation between OFC activation and 
ratings of subjective pleasantness (Kringelbach et al. 2003) 
4.3.1 Subjective reward value  
Economic theories on valuation are directly connected to decision theory. The origin 
of decision theory is traced to a correspondence between Pascal and Fermant in 1654. 
They stated, that a decision maker would always choose the option offering the 
highest expected value (EV).  
 
 
EV = px  
 
where p represents the probability of  obtaining an outcome of x (e.g. $) 
 
The EV is simply computed by multiplying the probability of a prospect with its’ 
value. According to this theory a subject always would choose 100 Swiss francs with 
a chance of 50% compared to 49 Swiss francs for sure. Obviously, not everybody 
would make this choice. Decision makers, who are “risk averse” would rather chose 
49 Swiss francs for sure. Swiss mathematician Bernoulli (1738) suggested a solution 
for this problem. He asserted, that people do not evaluate options by the objective 
value, but rather by their utility or subjective value. For example, for a poor person, 
1000 Swiss francs are more worth, than for a wealthy person. Therefore marginal 
utility decreases as wealth increases. The linear value function of the EV-theory is 
exchanged by a concave utility function. 
 
 
EU = pu(x) 
 
u(x), represents the utility of obtaining outcome x with the probability of p 
 
Also, the expected utility theory (EUT) received criticism with respect to its validity. 
It could be experimentally shown, that people do not weight probabilities linearly, but 
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exhibit risk seeking for low probabilities (overestimating low probabilities) and risk 
aversion (underestimating high probabilities). These deviations from the EUT led to a 
new theory, the prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky, (1979), accounting for 
the above-described anomalies. The prospect theory makes assumptions on how 
consequences and probabilities are transformed into subjective values. Similarly as 
the expected utility theory, overall utility results of an integration of value and 
probability. However, the utility function in the EUT over states of wealth is replaced 
by a value function over gains and losses relative to a reference point. Additionally, 
the value of an outcome is weighted by a decision-weight, representing the impact of 
the relevant probability on the valuation of the prospect. Therefore, Kahneman and 
Tverskys’ theory relies on the Weber – Fechner law, where psychological response is 
a concave function of the magnitude of physical change in sensory and perceptual 
dimension. 
 
 
 
V (x, p) = v(x)w(p)  
 
v represents the subjective value for a consequence x. w weights the influence of the 
objective probability (p) on the attractiveness of a consequence.  
 
 
Figure 5. Fictive value function in prospect theory with the corresponding probability 
weighting function in the right panel.  
 
The major difference to the EVT and EUT is, that the prospect theory takes into 
account psychological factors (e.g. cognitive biases, motivational and emotional 
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factors) influencing valuation and the estimation of probabilities. In the following 
section some major factors influencing the valuation of utility are discussed.  
 
4.3.2 Contextual influences on valuation 
As outlined before decision-making is influenced by many psychological factors. For 
example, people exhibit discounting of valuation for delayed rewards. In humans and 
non-human primates, this effect was shown on a neuronal level (Freeman et al., 2009; 
Tesch and Sanfey, 2008; Woolverton et al., 2007). When subjects are faced with 
rewards in the future compared to instant rewards, activity in the VS was reduced, 
paralleling the diminishing value of future rewards (Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009).  
Another prime example of contextual influence on reward valuation is that people 
compare their choices with the outcome of alternative choices. This effect has been 
shown to influence the valuations of rewards. Several studies have investigated this 
effect on a neural level (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; Coricelli et al., 
2007) and suggested that the OFC and amygdala modulate the course of decision-
making through strong involvement of emotional inputs. More generally many human 
neuroimaging studies conjecture that the human reward system largely encodes 
reward values in relation to possible outcomes and not at an absolute scale (De 
Martino et al., 2006; Elliott et al., 2008; Fujiwara et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, human valuation is strongly influenced by the way information about a 
prospect is presented. For example, de Araujo et al., (2005) exposed subjects in an 
fMRI scanner to the odour of isovaleric acid (which has a cheese-like odour), and 
accompanied it with the words ‘cheddar cheese’ or ‘body odour’. Results indicated 
that subjects greatly preferred the scent when labelled ‘cheddar cheese’. Additionally 
they could show that activity in medial orbitofrontal cortex and rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex coded this subjective experience.  
A more ecological valid setting for modulating prospects is given with regards to 
brands, implying different degrees of preference. McClure et al., (2004), for instance, 
have shown that participants show stronger hemodynamic responses in reward-related 
brain regions (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), hippocampus, midbrain) when 
receiving a small amount of a soft drink pre-cued by a picture of a Coca-Cola can 
rather than by a circle of light or a picture of a Pepsi can. Schaefer and Rotte, (2007) 
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reported stronger activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and 
precuneus when participants were presented with logos of luxury and sports car 
brands compared with pragmatic, more economic car brands. In a study by Deppe et 
al., (2005), participants were asked to imagine choosing between pairs of brands. The 
authors reported reduced neural activity in regions associated with working memory 
and reasoning, and increased neural activity in regions related to emotion processing 
when presenting the most popular brand in terms of the market share as compared 
with less popular brands. Based on their findings, the authors postulate a winner-take-
all effect of a person's favourite brand on neural activation, an effect that would 
partially contradict the graded response to different amounts of monetary rewards. 
4.4 Research questions 
The present thesis sought to investigate the effects of brand preferences on the 
valuation of rewards within a well-specified psychological framework. In the first part 
of the thesis, two experiments were conducted in close collaboration with the Basic 
Research of the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung, E.V. (GFK), Nürnberg. One goal 
of the first two experiments was to test the potential of fMRI for consumer research. 
We therefore critically examined whether fMRI possesses the degree of resolution 
necessary to detect even relatively small differences between brands that are attractive 
to varying degrees, but whose ratings are uniformly positive. The other goal of the 
first two experiments was to explore, which specific structures within the human 
reward system exhibit brand-preference-modulated activation. Resolving this question 
should contribute to a better understanding on how brands and cultural information in 
general influence preferences in humans. At last, the first two experiments were 
designed to allow for investigating the suggested dissociation between an anticipatory 
reward component (reward prediction) and an evaluative reward component (reward 
outcome). This dissociation is important for understanding buying behaviour, since 
anticipation and evaluation may be associated with different facets of a brand: (a) 
motivational, action-relevant characteristics, and (b) emotional or cognitive evaluative 
aspects. 
The second part of the thesis focused on more basal aspects of reward valuation. The 
second experiment was designed to allow for comparing fMRI activity with a 
previous study of Tobler et al. (2005) examining single cell recordings in midbrain 
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dopamine neurons of macaques. Additional analyses on the dataset of the second 
experiment were conducted to explore hemodynamic time-courses in the VS. It was 
questioned, whether fMRI signals in the VS parallel specific response patterns in 
monkeys’ midbrain dopamine neurons. Secondly, we sought to investigate whether 
the effect of reward value “gain-adaptation” (see also chapter 3.2), reported in Tobler 
et al.’s (2005) single cell study is also evident at the level of the VS in humans.  
With respect to the slow temporal of fMRI, EEG has the advantage, to resolve 
correlates of brain activity on a millisecond-scale. In amend on the knowledge gained 
with fMRI methods we conducted an additional experiment, which was similar to the 
first two fMRI experiments but recorded correlates of brain activity with EEG. We 
were therefore interested in the temporal dynamics of reward evaluation. In most EEG 
studies ERPs at single electrodes within a specific time-window are examined. This 
common practice reflects a poor statistical and neurophysiologic representation of the 
high spatial and temporal sampling of modern EEG measurements. In the presented 
study a new data driven analysis approach was applied incorporating the full 
spatiotemporal resolution of EEG. The specific aim of the study was to determine at 
which time-windows ERP topographies covary significantly with reward values of 
gained and omitted monetary rewards.  
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5 Experiments 
5.1 Experiment 1: Individual preferences modulate incentive values: Evidence 
from functional MRI  
Susan Koeneke1, Andreas F. Pedroni1, Anja Dieckmann2, Volker Bosch2, Lutz Jäncke1 
1 University of Zurich, Institute of Psychology, Division Neuropsychology, Switzerland  
2 GfK Association, Basic Research, Nuremberg, Germany 
5.1.1 Abstract 
Background 
In most studies on human reward processing reward intensity has been manipulated 
on an objective scale (e.g., varying monetary value). Everyday experience, however, 
teaches us that objectively equivalent rewards may differ substantially in their 
subjective incentive values. One factor influencing incentive values in humans is 
branding. The current study explores the hypothesis that individual brand preferences 
modulate activity in reward areas similarly to objectively measurable differences in 
reward intensity. 
Methods 
A wheel-of-fortune game comprising an anticipation phase and a subsequent outcome 
evaluation phase was implemented. Inside a 3 Tesla MRI scanner, 19 participants 
played for chocolate bars of three different brands that differed in subjective 
attractiveness.   
Results 
Parametrical analysis of the obtained fMRI data demonstrated that the level of activity 
in anatomically distinct neural networks was linearly associated with the subjective 
preference hierarchy of the brands played for. Preference-dependent neural activity 
has been registered in premotor areas, insular cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and in the 
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midbrain during the anticipation phases and in the caudate nucleus, precuneus, lingual 
gyrus, cerebellum, and in the pallidum during the outcome phases.  
Conclusion 
Our results suggest a graded effect of differently preferred brands onto the incentive 
value of objectively equivalent rewards. Regarding the anticipation phase, the results 
reflect an intensified state of wanting that facilitates action preparation when the 
participants play for their favourite brand. This mechanism may underlie approach 
behaviour in real-life choice situations.  
5.1.2 Background 
What counts as reward differs substantially depending on individual preferences. 
Branding can elicit robust differences in preferences for consumer products despite 
their highly similar appearance and may therefore provide an ideal measure of truly 
subjective preference in that it is largely independent of objective stimulus 
characteristics. Indeed, branding is often viewed as the addition of value and meaning 
to often quite mundane and interchangeable products [e.g., 1]. Current theories of 
reward processing have paid increasing attention to such cultural influences on choice 
behaviour. Our aim is to expand these theories by examining the modulatory impact 
of subjective brand preferences on neural activity. Furthermore, the external validity 
of our findings is greatly enhanced by the high relevance of brands in everyday life. 
Most previous research on the neural representation of reward has focused on the 
manipulation of reward according to an objectively quantifiable scale without 
therefore having to consider individual differences in preferences. There is no doubt 
that people have a general preference for larger rather than smaller amounts of money. 
Many human imaging studies have made explicit use of various degrees of monetary 
incentive value as means to manipulating reward intensity, and have reported several 
neural regions that adapt their activity according to change in reward intensity. 
O'Doherty et al., for example, reported stronger recruitment of the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) upon gaining higher compared with smaller amounts of 
money in a two-alternative choice task [2]. In another study, Breiter et al. identified 
the sublenticular extended amygdale (SLEA), the Nucleus accumbens (NACC) and 
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the hypothalamus as showing a scaled neural response in correspondence with the 
value of received monetary gain [3]. In addition, neural activation patterns in the 
SLEA and in the OFC reflected the value of the potential rewards in the period in 
which participants anticipated the outcome. A later study by Knutson et al. found a 
dissociation of neural circuits involved in different aspects of reward: While the 
ventral striatum (incl. NACC) was strongly active during the anticipation of monetary 
reward, the mesial prefrontal cortex (PFC), the parietal cortex and the posterior 
cingulum were active following feedback to the participants of having successfully 
obtained reward [4]. During reward anticipation, the NACC activity was positively 
correlated with the magnitude of the monetary reward.  
However, even the rewarding value of money may be influenced by context effects. 
Counterfactual reasoning, for example, refers to the human tendency to compare their 
choices with the outcome of alternatives. Winning Sfr. 5 in gambling most certainly 
evokes a degree of satisfaction, whereas winning Sfr. 5 while knowing that one could 
have won Sfr. 10 had one chosen differently evokes regret or disappointment [5]. The 
neural underpinnings of this effect have recently been investigated [6-8]. The concept 
of delayed discounting, concerning the point in time when a reward is delivered, is a 
further example of the effect of contextual information on the perceived value of a 
certain reward [9, 10, 11, 12]. Early animal studies strengthen this finding [13]. 
Counterfactual reasoning and delayed discounting, however, reflect population-
specific effects, meaning that the contextual information has a similar impact on each 
subject.   
Food, on the other hand, might be a universal primary reinforcer but people greatly 
differ in their taste preferences. Similarly, interindividual variance in the 
attractiveness of a reward also characterizes branded consumer goods. The neural 
representation of brand preferences has recently received considerable attention. 
McClure, for instance, reported that participants show stronger hemodynamic 
responses in reward-related brain regions (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
hippocampus, midbrain) when receiving a small amount of a soft drink pre-cued by a 
picture of a Coca-Cola rather than by a circle of light or a picture of a Pepsi can [14]. 
Schaefer and Rotte reported stronger activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) and precuneus when participants were presented with logos of luxury and 
sports car brands compared with pragmatic, more economic car brands [15]. In a 
study by Deppe et al., participants were asked to imagine choosing between pairs of 
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brands [16]. The authors reported reduced neural activity in regions associated with 
working memory and reasoning and increased neural activity in regions related to 
emotion processing when presenting the most popular brand in terms of the market 
share as compared with less popular brands. Based on their findings, the authors 
postulate a winner-take-all effect of a person’s favourite brand on neural activation, 
an effect that would however partially contradict the graded response to different 
amounts of monetary rewards. 
To our knowledge, however, none of the available studies on brand preferences used 
participants’ stated preferences as a means to specifically varying the subjective 
attractiveness of the selected brands. Furthermore, previous brain imaging studies of 
brand preferences did not clearly differentiate between the period of anticipating and 
that of receiving reward. While this distinction between anticipatory (wanting) and 
evaluative (liking) components has already been proposed by Berridge on the basis of 
animal studies [17], and evidence from human studies using monetary reward 
supports this concept [3, 18], the available studies on brand preferences may have 
confounded motivational with evaluative components of reward processing. Finally, 
the use of more than two preference categories is a necessary precondition to 
unequivocally determining any modulatory influence of brand preference on neural 
activity pattern. It may well be that, similar to monetary rewards; brand-associated 
neural activity increases monotonically with the strength of the individual preference 
for a particular brand. 
To address these issues, we developed a wheel-of-fortune game that allowed for the 
differentiation between an anticipation period (spinning of the wheel; wishing for a 
positive outcome) and an outcome period (processing the game outcome). Chocolate 
bars of three different brands could be won. By using chocolate bars as rewarding 
stimuli we introduced a product category with relatively homogeneous pricing so as to 
avoid the coupling of reward intensity with monetary value, which may be neurally 
processed in a different way. Established market research instruments were used prior 
to the fMRI experiment to determine participants’ individual brand preferences. 
Based on the results of these instruments, brands that differed in subjective 
attractiveness were selected individually for each participant and used as stimuli in an 
fMRI experiment. During the experiment, brands were represented by their logos. 
However, real chocolate bars were given to the participants after the experiment.  
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The primary aim of our study was to explore whether there are neural structures that 
modulate their activation according to the subjective preferences for the chocolate bar 
brands that the participants played for (e.g., higher activity in case of more preferred 
compared to less preferred chocolate brands). Additionally, the design allowed for 
investigating the suggested dissociation between an anticipatory reward component 
(game outcome unknown, wanting) and an evaluative reward component (evaluation 
of game outcome, liking). This dissociation is important for understanding buying 
behaviour, since anticipation and evaluation are associated with different facets of a 
brand: (a) motivational, action-relevant characteristics, and (b) emotional or cognitive 
evaluative aspects. 
5.1.3 Methods 
Participants 
Nineteen healthy female adult voluntary participants (mean age of 24.05 ± 2.63) were 
recruited from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Participants 
were selected based on a two-stage selection procedure. At the first stage, a paper and 
pencil questionnaire was distributed to students in different courses of the Psychology 
Department of the University of Zurich. Ninety-eight students completed the 
questionnaire. Of those, thirty-one respondents who indicated that they (a) ate 
chocolate at least from time to time, (b) cared about chocolate, (c) cared about brands 
when it came to chocolate and who expressed differentiated brand preferences in a 
constant sum point allocation “chip game” between different chocolate brands, were 
invited to the second round. Given that the majority of the participants who passed 
this first phase were female, we decided to restrict the study to women. However, we 
do not expect gender differences in the neural representation of rewards differing in 
subjective attractiveness. Twenty-seven of the pre-selected participants accepted the 
invitation and filled out a second, computer-based questionnaire that aimed at 
measuring individual brand preferences in more detail with a choice-based procedure 
(the GfK Price Challenger, GPC) and, again, with a constant sum chip game. Of 
those, twenty respondents who expressed preferences that were consistent across the 
two measures and widely dispersed to allow for clear brand differentiation were 
finally invited to the fMRI study. One participant dropped out for private reasons. The 
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remaining nineteen participants gave informed consent approved by the local ethics 
committee. Participation was compensated with 50.00 sFr and the amount of 
chocolate bars won. 
Task design 
Participants played a virtual wheel-of-fortune game presented via a video projector 
onto a translucent screen that participants viewed inside the scanner via a mirror. The 
experiment consisted of four runs with 30 trials each. Routinely, individual T1-
weighted anatomic brain images were recorded before the actual experimental 
sessions started. The total scanning time was approximately 50 minutes.  
Before being scanned, participants were carefully informed with respect to the MRI / 
fMRI method. Following this, each participant had to (1) complete a questionnaire 
that checked for individual MR-suitability and (2) to give his / her written informed 
consent. Then, participants were requested to read a short instruction manual, which 
explained the procedures of the experiment, and played two trials of the wheel-of-
fortune game outside the scanner in order to make sure that they had understood the 
task.  
The experiment had a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design: Participants played for three different 
chocolate brands (1st factor). These brands were selected based on the preference data 
gathered in the second stage of the selection procedure. For each participant, her 
favourite and her least preferred yet still acceptable brand were selected, as well as 
one intermediate brand that ranked between the top and the bottom brand. There were 
two types of trials (2nd factor), winning trials and losing trials, with two possible 
outcomes, respectively (3rd factor): In winning trials participants either won or did 
not win a chocolate bar; in losing trials, already won chocolate bars were either lost or 
not lost. The main focus of our study was on the hemodynamic responses to winning 
trials, that is, to positive anticipation and outcomes. We implemented separate losing 
trials rather than combining winning and loosing in one trial (win a chocolate bar vs. 
loose a chocolate bar) in order to detach negative, apprehensive processes that might 
predominate in some participants from more cheerful positive expectancy. There is 
recent empirical evidence that participants anticipate emotional events of unknown 
valence to be negative or unpleasant [19]. By separating the anticipation of positive 
from the anticipation of negative outcomes we circumvented this potential problem. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of six different pseudorandom trial 
sequences. In each trial, the chance of winning or losing a chocolate bar was 
approximately fifty percent. Also the brands the participants played for were pseudo-
randomly distributed to ensure enough trials of every possible combination (brand x 
trial type x outcome) for the analysis.  
One trial consisted of an announcement phase (1 sec.), a response phase (0.2 - 2 sec), 
an anticipation phase (10 sec.), an outcome phase (3 sec.), and a blank screen with a 
fixation cross (6 sec.; see Figure 1). In the announcement phase the brand logo was 
presented in the middle of a wheel of fortune with six colored (green for wining trials, 
red for losing trials) and six black fields. The colors indicated the trial type (winning 
trial vs. losing trial). During the response phase, participants could control the entry 
speed of the rotation of the wheel of fortune by pressing a button early or late within 
the time window. This was implemented to give participants the feeling of being 
actively involved in the game Additionally, the variable response latency (200 ms – 
2000 ms) induced a dephasing of stimulus onsets with respect to scan onsets to 
optimize sampling of the hemodynamic response. The entry speed did not affect the 
(pseudo-randomized) outcome of the prior anticipation phase. The anticipation phase 
started with the wheel of fortune rotating at the selected entry speed, slowing down to 
halt after 10 seconds. The ensuing outcome-phase started after the wheel had stopped. 
The outcome was indicated by the field that came to a halt under a pin at the top of 
the wheel and it was also indicated in a text box (i.e., “You have won/lost 1/0 
chocolate bars”). To ensure that the fMRI signal could level back to a task-unspecific 
baseline, a blank screen with a fixation cross was presented for six seconds before the 
next trial started. 
 
Figure 1. Experimental design of the wheel-of-fortune game 
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At the beginning of the experiment, each participant started with an account of three 
chocolate bars of each brand. It had been made clear to participants during the 
instructions prior to scanning that all major tastes of the brands they played for were 
available to choose from (e.g., dark chocolate, milk chocolate, hazelnut). Thus, 
participants did not have to fear that they would end up with tastes they did not like. 
After each of the four runs the number of chocolate bars was accounted and the 
balance was visually presented. This balance was transferred to the next run. After the 
experiment, participants received the total number of chocolate bars won (on average 
8.83 chocolate bars), thus ensuring that the wheel-of-fortune game offered real 
incentives. Finally, after the four runs were finished, the participants were paid 50.00 
sFr, given the won chocolate bars in the taste variants of their choice, and dismissed. 
Trials in which participants missed starting the wheel of fortune (i.e., did not press the 
button within two seconds) were regarded as no-interest trials and excluded from the 
statistical analyses. The total number of missed trials across all participants was 8, 
with a maximum of two lost trials for two of the participants. 
Functional imaging 
A Philips Intera 3T whole-body MR unit (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The 
Netherlands) equipped with an eight-channel Philips SENSE head coil was used to 
acquire magnetic resonance images at the University Hospital Zurich. Anatomical 
images of the whole brain were obtained by using a T1-weighted three-dimensional, 
spoiled, gradient echo pulse sequence (repetition time (TR)=20 ms, echo time 
(TE)=2.30 ms, flip angle 20°, field of view (FOV)=220 mm, acquisition matrix=224 x 
224, voxel size=1 mm x 1 mm 0.75 mm, 180 slices, slice thickness=0.75 mm). 
Functional data for the behavioural tasks were obtained from 280 whole-head scans 
per run (1120 for 4 runs) using a Sensitivity Encoded (SENSE) [20] single-shot 
echoplanar imaging technique (TR = 2500ms, TE = 35ms, flip angle = 78°, FOV = 
220mm, acquisition matrix= 80 x 80, 33 transverse slices, voxel size= 1.72 mm x 1.72 
mm x 4 mm). 
Data analysis 
Artefact minimization and MRI data analysis were performed using MATLAB 2006b 
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA), and the SPM5 software package 
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(Institute of Neurology, London, UK). The first three images were discarded to allow 
for steady-state magnetization. All images were realigned to the first image of the first 
run, spatially normalized into standard stereotactic MNI-space (EPI template provided 
by the Montreal Neurological Institute), interpolated to a voxel size of 2 x 2 x 2 mm 
and spatially smoothed using a 8-mm full-with-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel.  
Activated voxels were identified by the “General Linear Model” approach, 
implemented in SPM5. At the first level of analysis, we adopted a parametric analysis 
according to Büchel et al. [21]. After highpass-filtering (cut-off 128 s), an individual 
statistical model was computed for each participant with separate regressors for the 
response phase (modelled as events), for the anticipation phase of winning and losing 
trials (each modelled as epochs of 10s), and for each possible outcome type (won 
winning trial, not-won winning trial, lost losing trial, not-lost losing trial, modelled as 
epochs of 3s). All regressors were convolved with SPM’s canonical difference of 
gammas hemodynamic response function. The maximal cross-correlation between 
regressors was on average r = 0.156 (0.033 SD) across all subjects.  
Given that the main purpose of the analysis was to identify regions whose 
hemodynamic response monotonically increased or decreased with individual brand 
ranking, the ranks of the brands in the individual preference hierarchy were included 
in the model as modulatory parameters (i.e., 3, 2, 1, from the most to the least 
preferred brand). Linear contrasts of the first order terms against a baseline (6 seconds 
rest epoch, blank screen with fixation cross) were performed. This was applied to the 
anticipation phases of winning trials and losing trials, the outcome phases of winning 
trials that were won and not won, and the outcome phases of losing trials that were 
not lost and lost (contrasts are indicated by **1, e.g., WA1). To additionally obtain 
results of the main effect of the task, individual baseline contrasts were performed 
using the zeroth order regressor of the respective conditions (contrasts are indicated 
by **0, e.g., WA0). A complete list of all experimental conditions is given in table 1. 
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Table 1. List of experimental conditions.  
Trial type: Phase: Outcome:  Abbreviation: 
Winning Anticipation Won & not won WA 
Winning Outcome Won WOW 
Winning Outcome Not won WOnW 
Losing Anticipation Lost & not lost LA 
Losing Outcome Lost LOL 
Losing Outcome Not lost LOnL 
 
To permit population-level inferences, maps of contrast coefficients for each of the 
first level contrasts were collectively submitted to one-sample t tests against the null 
hypothesis of no activation, while controlling for random effects. Given that the 
outcome phase immediately followed the anticipation phase yields the possibility that 
clusters of activation found in the outcome phase are also due to continuing activity 
elicited during the anticipation phase.  Taking this possible confound into account, we 
additionally reduced the search area for activations in the outcome phase (WOW1, 
WOnW1, LOL1 LOnL1) to the areas activated by the preceding anticipation phase 
(WA1, LA1). No clusters of activation remained.  
To explore the full range of effects in the data, voxels surviving significance 
thresholding at p < .001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons with a spatial extent 
threshold at k = 10 voxel were reported. For specific regions a priori hypotheses could 
be derived from findings of prior studies using reward paradigms [18, 22, 23, 24]. 
Small volume corrections (SVCs) were used for these regions to correct the false 
positive error probability for the number of comparisons made within each region. 
SVCs were applied with a sphere of 8 mm, chosen to be equal to the spatial 
smoothing kernel [25, 26, 27]. Peaks surviving p < .05 family wise error (FWE) 
correction were considered significant. The cluster locations were indicated by the 
coordinates of the voxel at the local cluster maximum and labelled using the 
automated anatomical labelling (AAL) toolbox [28]. Cluster locations that were not 
identified with the AAL toolbox were manually labelled with reference to the 
Harvard-Oxford subcortical structural atlas. By overlaying the statistical parametric 
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maps on an averaged and normalized structural (T1) image of all subjects, we assured 
that the reported cluster locations were within the reported neuronal structures. 
5.1.4 Results 
The main focus of our study was placed on brain regions in which neuronal responses 
increase or decrease monotonically with increasing brand preference during the 
anticipation phase preceding winning trials (WA) and the outcome phase following 
gains in winning trials (WOW). This represents the first order term in the parametric 
analysis. We also included losing trials into our experiment to balance the amount of 
gained rewards and to dissociate gain from loss phases (see methods section). For 
descriptive purposes, we additionally conducted first order parametrical analyses of 
anticipation phases of losing trials (LA1) and outcome phases of lost losing trials 
(LOL1) [Additional file 1]. No significant preference modulated clusters (p < .001 for 
multiple comparisons) were located for outcomes with no effect on gaining or losing 
chocolate bars (WOnW1 and LOnL1) conditions. Thus, the reported findings refer to 
expectations and outcomes of rewards (chocolate bars) rather than to an unspecific 
effect of brand logo presentation.  
Main effects of task 
The effects of the zeroth order term of the parametric analysis (main effect of the 
tasks) were not of interest for the current study question. For the sake of completeness 
the corresponding results of WA0 and WOW0 are listed in the supplement. 
Regions responding in correlation with preferences during the anticipation phase 
of winning trials  
In the contrasts of the first order parametric modulation of the anticipation phase of 
winning trials (WA1), several brain areas revealed hemodynamic responses linearly 
increasing with higher subjective preference: Left caudal premotor area, right rostral 
premotor area, right lateral orbitofrontal cortex reaching into the anterior insula, right 
posterior superior temporal sulcus / anterolateral intraparietal sulcus, and the 
dopaminergic midbrain.  
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Clusters of voxels showing a linear decrease in neural activity with higher subjective 
preferences (WA1) were located in the left middle frontal gyrus, left middle cingulate 
cortex, bilateral precuneus, left calcarine sulcus, left angular gyrus, left lingual gyrus, 
left fusiform gyrus and right middle cerebellum (Figure 2, Table 2).  
Table 2. Clusters with preference-dependent activity during the anticipation phase. All 
clusters show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole brain multiple 
comparisons. The coordinates and t values are at the peak voxels in each cluster 
(coordinates refer to MNI-space). Clusters written in bold letters are within a priori 
hypothesized regions and are below a significance threshold of p < .05 family wise 
error corrected for small volumes (sphere with 8 mm radius). 
Coordinates Neural activity in regions  Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) 
X Y Z 
t-value 
increasing linearly with subjective preference: 
   Caudal premotor area L 99 -16 -8 62 5.89 
   Rostral premotor area R 13 16 4 68 3.86 
   Lateral orbitofrontal cortex / 
anterior insula 
R 15 44 28 -12 3.97 
      Posterior superior temporal sulcus/  
anterolateral intraparietal sulcus 
R 11 42 -48 14 4.18 
   Dopaminergic midbrain 
(substantia     nigra) 
R 33 10 -18 -6 4.01 
decreasing linearly with subjective preference: 
   Middle frontal gyrus L 71 -36 12 60 6.02 
   Posterior cingulate cortex L 32 -4 -30 40 4.85 
   Posterior cingulate cortex L 38 -16 -50 36 4.36 
   Precuneus L 443 -4 -50 8 5.67 
      Precuneus     R  6 -52 14 5.23 
      Precuneus L  -2 -58 26 3.84 
   Precuneus  L 173 -2 -72 34 4.66 
       Calcarine sulcus L  -4 -70 16 4.08 
   Middle occipital cortex  L 88 -42 -76 34 4.74 
       Angular gyrus L  -52 -74 26 4.78 
  Lingual gyrus L 35 -8 -80 -8 4.34 
       Lingual gyrus L  -16 -82 -6 3.92 
  Fusiform gyrus L 13 -26 -42 -14 4.28 
  Middle cerebellum 10  R 15 28 -36 -40 4.65 
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Figure 2. Brain regions responding in correlation with preferences during the 
anticipation phase of winning trials. (A) Bilateral mesial premotor / supplementary 
motor area showing most powerful activations, (B) right superior temporal sulcus, and 
(C) right anterior insula / lateral orbitofrontal cortex with significant activation 
patterns at uncorrected level of p < .001 with clusters with more than 10 voxels. (D) A 
cluster of midbrain activation was found at a close to significant level after small 
volume correction at threshold level p < .01. Neural activity in brain regions 
negatively linearly modulated by the brand preference (i.e., showing less activity for 
more preferred brands) during the anticipation phase: (E) left frontal middle gyrus, (F) 
left posterior cingulate cortex, (G) left precuneus. 
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Regions responding in correlation with preferences during the outcome phase of 
won winning trials 
In the outcome phase of won winning trials, clusters of voxels in the following 
regions increased their hemodynamic response linearly with higher subjective 
preference for the reward (WOW1): The right precuneus, right supramarginal gyrus, 
left and right lingual gyrus, left posterior cingulum, right caudate nucleus, right 
superior temporal sulcus, right postcentral gyrus, right and left cerebellum including 
the vermis, left middle temporal gyrus, left superior occipital areas, right frontal 
inferior operculum, right superior frontal area, left angular gyrus and the right ventral 
pallidum (Figure 3, Table 3).  
Table 3. Clusters with preference-dependent activity during the outcome phase. All 
clusters show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole-brain multiple 
comparisons. The coordinates and t values are at the peak voxels in each cluster 
(coordinates refer to MNI-space). Clusters written in bold letters are within a priori 
hypothesized regions and are below a significance threshold of p < .05 family wise 
error corrected for small volumes (sphere with 8 mm radius). 
Coordinates Neural activity of regions increasing 
linearly with subjective preference: 
Right/ 
Left 
Cluster Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value 
Caudate nucleus  R 51 18 8 18 5.19 
      Caudate nucleus R  16 2 26 4.92 
Ventral pallidum R 82 24 2 -8 4.28 
Precuneus R 200 6 -46 6 5.88 
      Posterior cingulum L  -2 -42 8 5.21 
      Vermis L/R  0 -54 -4 4.24 
Precuneus R 24 16 -60 40 5.25 
Lingual gyrus L 187 -20 -72 -4 5.29 
     Lingual gyrus L  -14 -82 -12 4.89 
     Lingual gyrus L  -12 -80 -2 4.68 
Superior occipital  L 16 -14 -96 20 4.47 
Lingual gyrus L 16 -14 -56 0 3.90 
Lingual gyrus  L 29 -6 -66 4 4.03 
Lingual gyrus R 74 22 -90 -16 4.82 
 Inferior occipital gyrus R  34 -22 -16 3.74 
Lingual gyrus R 35 22 -52 -2 4.40 
     Lingual gyrus R  14 -50 -4 4.26 
Cerebellum crus1 R 140 16 -82 -28 4.62 
     Cerebellum crus 1  R  6 -20 -22 4.34 
Cerebellum crus 1  L 20 -22 -66 -34 4.22 
Superior temporal gyrus R 19 52 -26 16 4.90 
Supramarginal gyrus R 62 42 -42 22 5.57 
Supramarginal gyrus R 13 46 -28 28 4.49 
Middle temporal gyrus L 13 -38 -56 16 4.55 
     Angluar gyrus L  -42 -52 22 3.98 
Postcentral gyrus R 13 38 -30 54 4.86 
Frontal inferior gyrus, triangular part  R 14 28 16 20 4.16 
Superior frontal gyrus R 12 18 28 40 4.15 
 
43 
 
 
Figure 3. Brain regions responding in correlation with preferences during the 
outcome phase of won winning trials. (A) Caudate nucleus, (B) pallidum, (C)/(D) 
lingual gyrus, (E)/(F) cerebellum crus 1. 
The analysis revealed no significant clusters of voxels with a linear decrease in 
activity to the parameter of subjective preference (WOW1). 
5.1.5 Discussion 
The anticipation of acquiring desired objects plays an essential role in everyday life. 
There are clear interindividual differences in the preferences for choice alternatives, 
be it in connection with fashion, food, or cars. However, it is unclear whether 
subjectively defined preference levels (e.g., most preferred brand) are differentially 
reflected on the neural level across individuals. Therefore, the purpose of the present 
study was to investigate brain areas that are sensitive to subjective reward intensity. 
For this purpose, we evaluated the neural activation patterns associated with the 
expectation and evaluation of receiving desired compared to less desired objects. A 
further aim of this study was to examine whether the modulation of neural activity by 
the intensity of brand attractiveness was evident in a distinct neural network during 
the anticipation of the desired objects and during the evaluation of the game outcome. 
Using a wheel-of-fortune game, we found that the hemodynamic responses in the 
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premotor cortex, the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, the insula, and the dopaminergic 
midbrain are linearly correlated with the subjective preference of a desired object. 
Such areas were most strongly activated while the participants expected to win the 
most desired object. In addition, the hemodynamic responses in the left middle frontal 
gyrus, posterior cingulate cortex and several extrastriate visual areas were negatively 
correlated with the expectation to win a desired object. In the ensuing outcome phase, 
while participants evaluated the positive game outcome, a distinct neural network 
commonly associated with attentional processes, sympathetic arousal, and cognitive-
emotional evaluation of rewards showed preference-modulated activity. 
Anticipation phase of winning trials  
The most striking finding of our study is a linear increase in hemodynamic responses 
in the left caudal and rostral premotor cortex the more participants desired to win a 
chocolate bar. Previous studies also found reward-dependent activation in premotor 
areas. It was, for example, reported that premotor regions become more active with 
increasing monetary reward in a target detection task [24]. Also, in non-human 
primates, dorsal but also lateral prefrontal regions including the premotor cortex were 
rendered active while expecting rewards [29]. Furthermore, Roesch and Olson 
reported increasing activity in premotor neurons in macaque brains dependent on the 
value of a predicted reward [30]. In contrast to these studies, reward delivery in our 
study did not depend on an instrumental motor action (e.g., grasping a reward). Thus, 
a simple motor preparation account is not sufficient to explain our finding. We 
interpret the increase in bilateral premotor activity as an increased state of motor 
preparedness, which may facilitate approaching behaviour. It is conceivable that the 
modulation of motor preparedness by different values of subjective brand preferences 
occurs automatically due to action-inducing characteristics of such incentive stimuli. 
In a low-involvement, buying situation increased premotor activity could already be 
sufficient to "tip the scales" so that a person snatches at one product without making a 
conscious decision to do so.  
The reduced hemodynamic responses in the left MFG in anticipation of winning a 
more preferred chocolate bar may reflect the functional antagonist to the increased 
premotor activity. In a meta-analytic study, Rubia and colleagues. report that this area 
(besides others) is activated in several Go/No-Go tasks – a task demanding high-level 
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cognitive functions of decision-making, response selection and response inhibition 
[31]. When playing for a more preferred chocolate brand in our study, such cognitive 
control of motor functions may be reduced. Support for this idea comes from Deppe 
et al. who report decreased neural activity in the left hemispheric middle frontal gyrus 
when participants imagined making binary decisions between a target brand, which 
was the market leader, and another (less popular) brand, as compared with choices 
between two less popular brands [16]. In another recent study, Schaefer and Rotte 
found reduced activation in a right hemispheric homologue when participants saw 
attractive car brands compared to less attractive car brands [32]. Both research groups 
concluded that rational thinking might be reduced when confronted with favoured 
brands.  
In summary, the pattern of activity in the above mentioned neural network indicates 
an increased state of motivation for motor action (e.g., facilitating approaching 
behaviour). But what inherent properties of an object make it more desirable (so that 
it will be approached more frequently) than others? The increased hemodynamic 
responses in the right anterior insula / lateral orbitofrontal cortex when playing for 
preferred chocolate brands may signal enhanced somatic arousal associated with a 
favourite reward. Supporting this idea, the right insula plays a prominent role in the 
somatic-marker hypothesis [33]. According to this hypothesis, insular activation 
provides a neural substrate of emotional feeling states arising from automatic 
somatosensory responses, making them available to cortical processing and conscious 
awareness. In line with this idea, Critchley and colleagues found right hemispheric 
activation in anterior insular and orbitofrontal regions associated with sympathetic 
arousal in a reward-related decision-making task [34]. The authors suggested that 
these two regions are modulated by changes in peripheral somatic states and involved 
in the flexible representation of reinforcement [35].   
We discovered preference-modulated hemodynamic responses in mesolimbic regions 
in the right midbrain. Dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain reflect the incentive or 
motivational value of a future reward and are associated with a subjective state of 
wanting [23, 36]. Additionally, studies with non-human primates demonstrated 
increased firing rates in dopaminergic midbrain neurons during the anticipation of 
rewards after associations between predictive cues and reinforcers have been learned 
[37]. In the case of the chocolate brand logos that we used, the association between 
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the predictive cues (i.e., the logos) and reinforcers (e.g., delicious chocolate) has 
likely been established by previous learning experiences of our participants.  
The cluster of preference-modulated activity in the right anterolateral intraparietal 
region, which extends into the superior temporal sulcus (STS) probably reflects the 
process of inferring from the motion of the wheel whether the trial will be won or not; 
the higher the incentive value of the reward, the more relevant is this prediction. In 
previous studies, increased activity in this area was assumed to reflect action-outcome 
prediction through observation [38, 39]. Furthermore, the anatomical proximity to the 
parietal cortex, which has been found to be involved in visuo-spatial processing [40], 
underpins the notion that this area could be involved in the processing of spatial 
contiguity between current position and desired outcome position. 
The negatively correlated neural activity (lower hemodynamic response, while 
anticipation more desired objects) found in regions encompassing the posterior 
cingulate gyrus, precuneus, lingual gyrus, fusiform gyrus and cerebellum may be due 
to task induced deactivation (TID). TID refers to a relative decrease in regional 
activity, as measured by blood flow or the blood oxygenation level dependent 
(BOLD) signal, during an active task compared to a “resting” baseline [41]. We 
believe that the decrease in the BOLD signal in the above mentioned neural structures 
refers to a higher externally cued cognitive involvement in the anticipation phase for 
more preferred brands compared to less preferred brands, resulting in a higher 
suppression of internally generated information processing. The study of McKiernan 
showed that TID increased with task processing demands [41]. TID often occurs in 
the posterior cingulate cortex extending dorsally into the precuneus [42, 43], but also 
in the precuneus and fusiform gyrus [41] and has repeatedly been found with higher 
magnitude in the left cortical hemisphere [42, 43, 44]. 
In summary, hemodynamic responses increased in areas associated with motor 
preparation, emotional tagging of stimuli, reward expectation and spatial attention 
when participants were in expectation of the outcome of the wheel-of-fortune game, 
while playing for a more desired item. Conversely, neural activity in structures, 
involved in stop inhibition of motor responses and internal information processing 
linearly decreased. While expecting the outcome, participants encountered an 
increased state of wanting (dopaminergic midbrain!), external information processing 
(TID areas") and emotional tagging of the incentive stimulus (left anterior insula!), 
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leading to a state of facilitated action induction (bilateral premotor cortex!, middle 
frontal gyrus").  
Outcome phase of won winning trials 
In the time window after the participants saw the final outcome position of the wheel 
of fortune, preference-modulated activations were found in the caudate nucleus, 
precuneus, lingual gyrus, cerebellum, and, to a lesser extent, in the pallidum. Our 
results seem to reflect preference-dependent modulation of attentional processes, 
sympathetic arousal, and of cognitive-emotional evaluation of the reward value.  
When participants were “rewarded” with more preferred chocolate bars, we found 
increased activity in the right caudate nucleus, traditionally seen as a “motor” region. 
Findings of Haruno et al. suggest, however, that the caudate nucleus is strongly 
involved in reward based behavioural learning [45]. It has further been shown in 
monkeys [29, 46] and rats [47] that part of caudate-putamen neurons respond to food 
and drink reward stimuli in a manner similar to dopaminergic or ventral striatal 
neurons.  
The ventral pallidum (VP) has been suggested to represent a central relay station for 
the distributed brain circuit of core liking [17, 48], as well as a potential relay station 
to cortical systems of conscious pleasure [48]. Neurons in the VP are assumed to track 
the hedonic value of rewarding and appealing stimuli [49, 50]. Besides the more 
native activation of “liking” structures via taste reward and sexual- and competitive 
arousal, it has been shown that more abstract pleasures like monetary rewards also 
increase activity in the VP [18]. 
In the outcome phase many occipito-parietal regions, like the precuneus and parts of 
the lingual gyrus where found to be more active when winning a more preferred 
chocolate bar. We interpret this assembly of activations as a neural representation of 
top-down controlled visual attention. Playing for more preferred compared to less 
preferred chocolate bars is likely associated with a higher interest in the game 
outcome, which might cause a stronger attention focus on the outcome situation 
(visual perception and processing of the outcome). A cue for top-down attentional 
orientation in the visual field could be provided by an early tagging of emotional 
stimuli as Schupp et al. inferred from recent EEG studies [51, 52, 53].  
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We found brand-preference-modulated activity also in the cerebellum, namely in the 
vermis and right-sided crus 1. In addition to the predominant role in motor functions, 
it has been shown that the cerebellum is involved in higher cognitive and emotional 
processes [54]. The cerebellum is also an important component of autonomic control 
functioning. In line with this idea, Critchley et al. found distributed cerebellar 
activations similar to ours when participants experienced states of arousal [55]. 
Regarding our study, we can only speculate that some altered states of arousal may 
have occurred when winning a highly desired compared to a less desired chocolate 
bar.  
The interpretation of the activations in the superior temporal sulcus, middle temporal 
sulcus, supramarginal gyrus and postcentral gyrus, inferior frontal and superior frontal 
regions is somewhat difficult, since these regions are not known to be specifically 
involved in reward or feedback processing. Since the reward that participants received 
in this study was merely artificial in that they were reflected by the gain in chocolate 
bars summed up on an account, the increased activity in these regions could imply the 
processing of spatial information of the wheel of fortune (e.g., “what is the relation to 
the initial speed set and the position of the wheel when it stops?”). Alternatively, 
changes in cerebral blood flow may have been induced through a heightened state of 
emotional / autonomic arousal or through attentional processes. 
Neuronal networks increasingly active with brand preference in the outcome phase 
have been commonly linked to feedback processing, bodily perception of pleasurable 
arousal, and visuo-spatial attention. Participants registered the feedback of winning a 
more preferred brand with increased visual attention (occipital cortex!) leading to a 
positive pleasurable feeling (ventral pallidum!) accompanied with a heightened state 
of arousal (ventral pallidum!, cerebellum!).  
Limitations 
One has to bear in mind that the neural activity found in our study reflects to a certain 
degree interactions of subjective preference and the experimental task. For example, 
our participants expected a reward with uncertainty. It has been repeatedly shown that 
the factor of incentive probability partly alters the involvement of the reward network 
[18] [56, 57]. A second, and in our view, important factor is whether participants 
actually receive immediate material or delayed symbolic reward, obtaining in the 
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latter case the reward only after conclusion of the experiment. In our study, 
participants received the won bars of chocolate after the experiment outside the 
scanner. This is important, considering that partly different brain activations were 
produced for instance in the study of O’Doherty in which participants received 
differently tasting liquids during the experiment [23], compared with studies in which 
participants were rewarded with money after the scanning procedure [3, 24, 58].  
Hemodynamic responses in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the insula correlated 
with the subjective preference of the anticipated gain during expectation of the 
rewarding stimuli. Neural activity in the OFC is known to correlate with the incentive 
value of the expected reward [2]. The additional activations found in the insula 
support the idea that emotions and feelings are evoked in this phase. Some recent 
studies propose a functional dissociation between the lateral and mesial OFC 
activation. While the mesial OFC is most strongly involved during anticipation of 
rewarding stimuli, the lateral OFC seems to be more strongly activated when 
punishment or deficits are anticipated [59]. However, as winning trials were explicitly 
separated from loosing trials, the pattern of activation is unlikely to reflect 
engagement in anticipating losses or punishment rather than receiving rewarding 
stimuli.  
Although we found activations within the OFC and the insula during the expectation 
of rewards, we did not find strong activations in other brain areas that have been 
shown to be activated in previous studies exploring reward-related brain activations 
(e.g., prefrontal cortex or nucleus accumbens, for a review, see [56]). However, as 
mentioned above, there are considerable methodological differences between our and 
the other studies. The most striking difference between our and previous studies is 
that we use differentially preferred incentives of the same product class and same 
price category. The rewards expected by a participant – and evaluated after the 
outcome of the wheel-of-fortune game – did not differ significantly in their magnitude 
of objective (e.g., monetary) value, solely in the magnitude of subjective value. 
Participants possibly wanted to win each trial and “liked” every won winning trial. 
The rewards are objectively the same (one bar of chocolate), the only difference being 
the subjective preference of the reward. Our aim was to identify the neuronal 
correlates of the subjective, culturally learned preference that may be regarded as 
having a modulatory impact on wanting and liking, and as influencing approach (in 
this case buying) behaviour in many ambiguous decision-making situations.  
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Conclusion 
The results of our study clearly demonstrate that neural activation in reward 
processing structures is modulated by stimuli varying in subjective reward intensity. 
This modulation was evident in situations where participants anticipated a reward and 
in situations where participants evaluated a reward. Contrary to the winner-take-all 
hypothesis [16], neural activity was linearly associated with the subjective brand 
preference hierarchy, which is in line with studies using objectively varied amounts of 
money as rewards. Furthermore, distinct brand-preference-modulated areas were 
identified during anticipation and evaluation phases. When participants anticipate 
winning a more preferred brand they experience an increased state of wanting. This is 
characterized by intensified processing of external information and emotional tagging 
of the incentive stimulus, leading to a state of facilitated action induction. Thus, the 
pattern of activity may reflect approach behaviour in real life situations, such as 
opting for a particular product on the shopping shelf. 
5.1.6 Supplementary Data 
Supplement 1 
Table of significantly linearly modulated structures in the anticipation of losing trials. 
All clusters show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole-brain 
multiple comparisons. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak voxels in each 
cluster (coordinates refer to MNI-space). 
Coordinates Regions  Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value 
Increasing linearly with subjective preference 
   Caudate nucleus R 28 10 24 10 5.32 
   Caudate nucleus L 26 -12 18 16 4.83 
Decreasing linearly with subjective preference 
    Calcarine sulcus L 747 0 -90 14 6.07 
Superior occipital cortex L  -10 -100 24 4.36 
    Cuneus L  -6 -100 16 5.67 
    Lingual gyrus R 42 12 -62 -2 4.25 
      Lingual gyrus R  2 -68 -6 3.46 
      Lingual gyrus R  16 -54 -8 3.17 
Temporal pole superior  R  60 8 -10 3.45 
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Table of significantly linearly modulated structures in the outcome of lost losing 
trials. All clusters show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole-brain 
multiple comparisons. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak voxels in each 
cluster (coordinates refer to MNI-space). 
Coordinates Regions  Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value 
Increasing linearly with subjective preference 
   Inferior frontal operculum R 19 24 8 14 4.98 
   Posterior cingulum  L 20 -18 -42 20 4.85 
Decreasing linearly with subjective preference 
   Middle frontal gyrus L 26 -28 22 44 4.85 
Supplement 2  
Table of Main effects of the anticipation phase of winning trials (WA). All clusters 
show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole-brain multiple 
comparisons. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak voxels in each cluster 
(coordinates refer to MNI-space). 
Coordinates Regions  Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value 
Lateral occipital Cortex R 5933 26 -94 -10 19.79 
Lateral occipital Cortex L 4151 -30 -96 8 13.97 
Thalamus L 291 -24 -30 -4 10.66 
Thalamus R 378 22 -28 -2 9.49 
Caudate  L 58 -16 28 -4 5.33 
Caudate L 20 -22 -8 32 5.21 
Lateral ventricle / Caudate R 67 4 24 2 5.10 
Brainstem R 22 16 -28 -30 4.57 
Lateral orbitofrontal Cortex  R 467 32 22 -26 6.37 
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex  R 40 48 46 -16 5.11 
Inferior frontal gyrus L 491 -58 16 4 5.37 
Inferior frontal gyrus R 26 60 22 26 4.55 
Superior frontal gyrus R 14 30 4 68 4.06 
Insula  R 11 44 -6 22 4.22 
Premotor cortex L 43 -22 -8 60 4.42 
Premotor cortex  L 10 -40 -4 48 4.02 
Precentral gyrus R 116 38 -10 36 6.00 
Postcentral gyrus L 10 -60 -6 38 4.04 
Cerebellum R 23 12 -78 -46 4.49 
Vermis R 15 2 -34 -32 4.17 
White matter / posterior corona 
radiata 
L 12 -28 -30 28 4.29 
 
 
 
52 
Table of Main effects of the outcome phase of won winning trials (WOW). All 
clusters show a probability of error of p < .001 uncorrected for whole-brain multiple 
comparisons. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak voxels in each cluster 
(coordinates refer to MNI-space). 
Coordinates Regions  Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value 
Occipital cortex  R/L 14927 -8 -86 -12 11.34 
Parieto-occipital cortex L 2119 -48 -60 30 9.45 
Precuneus R 13 2 -62 62 4.51 
Caudate L 236 -14 0 28 6.08 
White matter / Caudate L 12 -12 14 22 5.23 
Caudate R 27 14 14 20 5.22 
Hippocampus  R 13 28 -32 8 4.91 
Parahippocampal gyrus L 17 -34 -12 -24 5.01 
Middle frontal gyrus L 174 -38 8 44 6.79 
Middle frontal gyrus R 211 40 26 24 6.07 
Inferior frontal gyrus L 526 -50 28 0 6.29 
Superior frontal gyrus  R 119 2 28 62 6.15 
Frontal Pole  R 48 44 52 -10 5.74 
Middle frontal gyrus R 73 42 18 48 5.68 
Frontal Pole  L 33 -2 62 26 5.63 
Orbitofrontal cortex L 46 -34 22 -26 5.50 
Frontal pole L 13 -6 64 -2 5.38 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex R 83 18 48 48 5.28 
Premotor cortex  L 158 -10 14 68 6.36 
Premotor cortex R 20 38 -20 68 4.89 
Posterior cingulate gyrus R 722 4 -46 34 5.43 
Middle temporal gyrus R 2422 68 -32 -8 9.20 
Temporal pole  R 113 52 16 -22 6.40 
Temporal Pole  L 12 -54 4 -26 5.54 
Middle temporal gyrus R 18 62 -4 -26 5.18 
Temporal pole  L 16 -40 16 -34 5.07 
Temporal pole R 33 38 18 -42 4.33 
Temporal fusiform cortex L 10 -44 -40 -22 4.92 
Precentral gyrus R 69 64 -2 10 4.62 
Postcentral gyrus R 327 10 -38 74 7.06 
Postcentral gyrus L 30 -12 -42 74 5.46 
Parietal operculum R 55 46 -8 18 6.46 
Parietal operculum L 130 -26 -30 20 6.06 
Parietal operculum R 45 40 -26 26 5.40 
Cerebellum R 29 28 -76 -50 5.41 
Cerebellum - 27 0 -72 -46 5.30 
Cerebellar tonsil  R 12 10 -56 -36 3.92 
White matter/ putamen R 108 32 -2 24 5.07 
Genu of corpus callosum L 191 -2 24 8 6.58 
Intraparietal Gyrus R 46 24 -54 36 4.54 
White matter / premotor cortex R 11 24 -22 44 4.31 
Lateral ventricle  R 13 6 -30 16 4.25 
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5.2 Experiment 2, Part 1: Brand preferences modulate neural activity during 
motivational and evaluative reward components. 
Andreas Pedroni1, Susan Koeneke1, Anja Dieckmann2, Volker Bosch2, Lutz Jäncke1 
1 University of Zurich, Institute of Psychology, Division Neuropsychology, Switzerland  
2 GfK Association, Basic Research, Nuremberg, Germany 
 
5.2.1 Summary 
Humans may differ remarkably in their preferences for objectively similar rewards. 
Brand preferences, for instance, largely account for differences in shopping 
behaviour. The current functional MRI study explores whether subjective brand 
preferences can be measured on the neural level. For this purpose, a wheel-of-fortune 
game comprising a prospect phase and a subsequent outcome evaluation phase was 
implemented. Participants played for vouchers for sneakers of three different brands 
that differed in subjective attractiveness. The results clearly demonstrate that neural 
activation in structures related to reward processing is linearly associated with the 
subjective brand preference hierarchy. Further, modulation of neural activity by 
preferred brands occurs in distinct neural regions during prospect and evaluation 
phases. Playing for more preferred compared to less preferred brands evokes an 
intensified state of wanting in the participant and facilitates action preparation - a 
mechanism that may underlie approach behaviour in real life choice situations. 
5.2.2 Introduction 
To account for variance in people’s choices, social scientists have introduced the 
concept of preferences. Based on the idea of utility maximization, the concept of 
preferences allows for assigning individually different utility values to outcomes, and 
is thus used to explain why people may be motivated by different incentive stimuli. 
With the advent of modern brain imaging techniques the neural underpinnings of 
motivational processing has received considerable interest. For example, it is well 
explored how reward-value associations are learned and dynamically updated in non-
human primates and humans [1][2]. Also the neural underpinnings of contextual 
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influences on reward values, like counterfactual reasoning [3], the effect of framing 
[4], satiety [5] and delay discounting [6] have been a matter of extensive research. 
However, the factor of subjectiveness of rewarding values – that is, subjectiveness of 
preferences – has rarely been investigated. In the current study, using branded 
products as an economically highly relevant example, we explore whether the factor 
of subjective preferences can explain differences in neural responses to rewarding 
events. 
In a previous study we were already able to show that stimuli with objectively similar 
characteristics elicited hemodynamic responses in reward related areas of the brain in 
dependency of the respective preference value [7]. Participants played a wheel-of-
fortune (WOF) game, where they could win or lose chocolate bars that differed in 
subjective value. Subjective value was operationalized in terms of brand preferences, 
which were a priori measured with state-of-the-art market-research tools. Given that 
brand preferences greatly differ between individuals and the objectively scaled values 
of related consumer goods (like price and quality) are often highly similar, we believe 
that such stimuli are ideal to investigate the variation of rewarding value on a 
subjective scale. Indeed effects of branding on activity in reward-related brain areas 
have been reported before [8]. For example, it has been shown, that the consummation 
of small amounts of soft drinks elicited stronger hemodynamic responses in reward 
related areas of the brain, when pre-cued by a logo of the market leader, rather than by 
a logo of another soft drink manufacturer [9]. To our knowledge, this effect however 
was not described for individual brand preference hierarchies before.  
The choice of chocolate as reward in the previous study had the advantage to 
incorporate a primary reinforcer, which has been shown to reliably elicit strong 
activations in reward-related brain regions [10]. One potential drawback of 
investigating subjective values of primary reinforcers is that the rewarding value of 
food is highly dependent on satiety [5]. It is assumable that this effect applies even if 
no direct food intake occurs, as it was the case in our last study. Furthermore, the 
preferences for one particular brand of chocolate might be more influenced by the 
flavour of one specific bar of chocolate than by the brand itself. In the present study 
we aimed to extend previous findings by using specific non-food rewards, for which it 
can be assumed, that subjective value is independent of the degree of satiety as well as 
primary sensory qualities such as flavour. We therefore chose fashion products for 
which we presume that subjective value is predominantly culturally transferred and 
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were interested in whether we can replicate the results found for chocolate brands. 
Also, the incentives used in the present study (a 150 SFr. voucher for a pair of 
sneakers of a particular brand) were monetarily much more valuable than what could 
be won in the initial study (on average around 10 bars of chocolate). By increasing the 
monetary incentive value, we aimed at also increasing the effects of subjective 
preferences for different brand versions of this incentive. Finally, besides changing 
the product class of the rewarding stimuli, modifications in the reward scheme were 
applied. In the previous study chocolate bars of three differentially preferred brands 
could be won or lost. Thus, a once gained reward could be lost in any subsequent trial. 
Alike, the probability to acquire a reward only increased towards the very end of the 
experiment. In the present study subjects could increase the probabilities for winning 
differently valued rewards, rather than accumulating (and loosing) rewards during the 
actual experiment. Therefore, reward values in every single trial were kept constant 
over the time-course of the experiment. By comprising these refinements we aimed to 
replicate and strengthen the previously reported findings and extend insights to more 
abstract and culturally transformed subjectively valued rewards. Finally we were 
interested in comparing neural responses of the “accumulating probability” reward 
scheme to results of commonly used reward schemes like gaining primary reinforcers 
or accumulating monetary rewards 
To address these issues, we used a wheel-of-fortune game that allowed for the 
differentiation between a prospect period (spinning of the wheel; wishing for a 
positive outcome) and an outcome period (processing the game outcome). During the 
fMRI session, subjects could win lottery tickets in repeated rounds of the wheel-of-
fortune game, thereby increasing their chance of winning in the subsequent lottery. In 
the lottery, subjects played for one voucher worth Sfr. 150 for one of three different 
sneaker brands. Established market research instruments were used prior to the fMRI 
experiment to determine participants’ individual preferences with respect to sneaker 
brands. Brands of high, intermediate and low subjective value were then selected for 
each participant and used as stimuli in the fMRI experiment. During the experiment, 
brands were represented by their logos. The rationale of our approach was that since 
the monetary value of each voucher was equal for the three brands, any elicited 
differences in neuronal activations could be exclusively attributed to differences in 
subjective value formed through individual brand preferences.  
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5.2.3 Methods 
Participants 
Sixteen healthy adult voluntary participants (9 female and 7 male, mean age of 24 ± 
4) were recruited from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, Switzerland. 
Participants were selected based on a two-stage selection procedure. At the first stage, 
a paper and pencil questionnaire was distributed to students in different courses of the 
Psychology Department of the University of Zurich. 200 students completed the 
questionnaire. Of those, 50 respondents who indicated that they (a) wore sneakers at 
least from time to time, (b) cared about sneakers, (c) cared about brands when it came 
to sneakers, and (d) who expressed differentiated brand preferences in a constant sum 
point allocation “chip game” between different sneaker brands, were invited to the 
second round. Twenty-seven of the pre-selected participants accepted the invitation 
and filled in a second, computer-based questionnaire that aimed at measuring 
individual brand preferences in more detail with a choice-based procedure [11] and, 
again, with a constant sum chip game. Of those, eighteen respondents were finally 
invited to the fMRI study. These participants expressed preferences that were 
consistent across the two measures and widely dispersed to allow for clear brand 
differentiation. Two participants dropped out due to private reasons. The local ethics 
committee approved the study and the participants gave written informed consent. 
The tasks and testing procedures were in accordance with institutional guidelines and 
the study conformed to the Declaration of Helsinki. Participation was compensated 
with 50.00 sFr. and a possible win of a voucher for a pair of sneakers, worth 150 sFr. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants played a virtual wheel-of-fortune game projected onto a translucent 
screen that participants viewed inside the scanner via a mirror. The experiment 
consisted of four runs with 25 trials each. Individual T1-weighted anatomic brain 
images were recorded after the actual experimental sessions. The total scanning time 
was approximately 50 minutes.  
Before being scanned, participants were informed with respect to the MRI / fMRI 
method. Following this, each participant had to (1) complete a questionnaire that 
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checked for individual MR-suitability and (2) to give his / her written informed 
consent. Then, participants were requested to read a short instruction manual, which 
explained the procedures of the experiment, and played two trials of the wheel-of-
fortune game outside the scanner to assure that they had understood the task correctly.  
The overall prize that could be won in our experiment was a voucher (worth 150 SFr.) 
for a pair of sneakers of a particular brand. The subjects played for this voucher in a 
lottery subsequent to the scanning session. During the scanning session, the subjects 
were able to win lottery tickets that increased the chance of winning in the subsequent 
lottery. In other words, a won trial in the wheel-of-fortune game increased the 
probability of winning the voucher for a certain sneaker brand.  
Based on the preference data gathered in the second stage of the selection procedure 
(see Participants section) 3 sneaker brands were determined for each subject: (1) 
her/his favourite brand, (2) her/his least preferred yet still acceptable brand, as well as 
(3) one intermediate brand that ranked between the top and the bottom brand. In each 
wheel-of-fortune trial one of 25 lottery tickets per brands could be won (i.e., 75 
lottery tickets in total). Trials were brand-specific meaning that a won trial increased 
the chance to win a voucher for one specific brand. Across the scanning session, the 
number of won lottery tickets for each brand was accounted. After the scanning 
session, the subjects were presented with three pots (one for each brand), each 
containing 25 lottery tickets, with one lot being the joker. The subjects then drew the 
amount of won lottery tickets separately for each brand. If the joker was drawn, 
participants received the voucher for the particular brand. If more than one voucher 
was won, they could freely choose one to take home. The chance to win was pseudo-
randomly varied at a chance of 50 percent. Thus, participants had the cumulative 
chance to win one of the three vouchers of 87.5 percent. The sequence of the brands 
the participants played for were pseudo-randomly distributed to ensure enough trials 
of every possible combination (brand, outcome) for the analysis. In addition, 25 trials 
where no lottery tickets could be won were randomly interspersed in the experiment 
to detect brain areas responding to the wheel-of-fortune game itself, resulting in a 
total of 100 trials. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, a trial consisted of a brand announcement phase (0.5 – 2 s), 
a response phase (placing the bet on green or red; 1-2 s), a prospect phase (wheel of 
fortune spins; 8-12 s), an outcome phase (outcome is presented; 3 s), a blank screen 
with a fixation cross (4-5 s), a picture of the actual balance (2 s), and a blank screen 
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with a fixation cross (6 s). In the announcement phase the logo of the brand subjects 
played for in the current trial was presented in the center of a wheel-of-fortune with 
twelve colored (6 green and 6 red) fields. During the response phase, participants 
could choose one color by pressing a button. The chose color field remained visible 
underneath the wheel while the other color field disappeared so that participants did 
not have to memorize their choice. The prospect phase started with the wheel-of-
fortune rotating and slowing down to halt after 8-12 seconds. The ensuing outcome-
phase started after the wheel had stopped. The outcome was indicated by the field that 
came to a halt under a pin at the top of the wheel and by a text box (i.e., “You have 
won 1 lot / You have not won”). A trial was won when the color chosen by the subject 
was consistent with the color of the field that came to a halt under the pin. To prevent 
participants from memorizing account balances, the balance of the number of lottery 
tickets for the respective brand acquired so far was indicated in each trial. This 
number was also translated into the probability of winning a voucher and represented 
as bar chart. A blank screen with a fixation cross was presented for six seconds before 
the next trial started to ensure that the fMRI signal could level back to a task-
unspecific baseline. 
 
Figure 1. Experimental design of the wheel-of-fortune game. 
Functional Imaging 
A Philips Intera 3T whole-body MR unit (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The 
Netherlands) equipped with an eight-channel Philips SENSE head coil was used to 
acquire magnetic resonance images. Anatomical images of the whole brain were 
obtained by using a T1-weighted three-dimensional, spoiled, gradient echo pulse 
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sequence (repetition time (TR) = 20 ms, echo time (TE) = 2.30 ms, flip angle = 20°, 
field of view (FOV) = 220 mm, acquisition matrix = 224 x 224, voxel size = 1.00 x 
1.00 x 0.75 mm, 180 slices, slice thickness = 0.75 mm). Functional data for the 
behavioural tasks were obtained from 310 whole-head scans per run using a 
Sensitivity Encoded (SENSE) single-shot echoplanar imaging technique (TR = 2500 
ms, TE = 35 ms, flip angle = 78°, FOV = 220 mm, acquisition matrix = 80 x 80, 33 
transverse slices, voxel size = 1.72 x 1.72 x 4.00 mm). 
Data Analysis 
Artefact elimination and MRI data analysis were performed using MATLAB 2006b 
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA), and the SPM5 software package 
(Institute of Neurology, London, UK). The first three images were discarded to allow 
for steady-state magnetization. All images were realigned to the first image of the first 
run, slice time corrected and spatially normalized into standard stereotactic MNI 
space (EPI template provided by the Montreal Neurological Institute), interpolated to 
a voxel size of 2.00 x 2.00 x 2.00 mm and spatially smoothed using a 8-mm full-with-
at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel.  
Activated voxels were identified by the general linear model approach implemented 
in SPM5. At the first level of analysis, we adopted a parametric analysis according to 
Buchel et al. (1998). After highpass-filtering (cut off 128 s), an individual statistical 
model was computed for each participant with separate regressors for the 
announcement phase (1 s), response phase (1-2 s), anticipation phase (8 – 12 s), the 
two types of outcome phases (3 s) and the presentation of the actual balance (2 s). The 
announcement, response and anticipation phases and the blank screen between 
outcome and balance had variable durations. Also, the time-lag between motor 
response for choosing a color and the onset of the anticipation phase (the start of the 
spinning of the wheel-of-fortune) was temporally jittered. This was implemented to 
(1) induce a dephasing of stimuli onsets with respect to scan onsets to optimize 
sampling of the hemodynamic response and (2) to temporally de-correlate regressors 
of interest. The resulting regressors were convolved with SPM’s canonical difference 
of gammas hemodynamic response function.  
The analysis mainly targeted regions whose hemodynamic response was modulated 
by individual brand ranking. Thus, the individual ranking of the brands were 
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introduced into the statistical model as first and second order modulatory parameters 
of the regressors of the announcement, anticipation, outcome and balance phases. 
Subsequently, linear contrasts of the first and second order terms against a baseline 
(blank screens) were performed. This was applied to the announcement, anticipation, 
outcome, and actual balance phases. In order to dissociate task-specific effects of the 
wheel-of-fortune game and brand preference specific effects, neutral trials were 
implemented (see Design and Procedure), which were modelled as separate regressors 
for each phase.  
To permit population-level inferences, maps of contrast coefficients for each of the 
first level contrasts were collectively submitted to one-sample t-tests against the null 
hypothesis of no increase in hemodynamic response, while controlling for random 
effects. Despite de-correlation of the anticipation and outcome phase through 
temporal jittering of the duration of the anticipation phase it was still possible that 
clusters of activation found in the outcome phase could be due to continuing activity 
elicited during the anticipation phase. Taking this possible confound into account, the 
search area for activations in the outcome phase was reduced to the areas activated by 
the preceding anticipation phase in an additional analysis. No clusters of activation 
remained.    
To explore a wide range of effects in the data, voxels surviving significance 
thresholding at p < .001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons with a spatial extent 
threshold at k = 10 voxels were reported. For specific regions, a-priori hypotheses 
were derived from previous reward paradigms [10, 12-14]. Within these regions, 
small volume corrections (SVC) were applied to correct the false positive error 
probability for the number of made comparisons. SVCs were applied with a sphere of 
8 mm, chosen to be equal to the spatial smoothing kernel [15]. Peaks surviving p < 
.05 family-wise-error (FWE) correction were considered significant.  
5.2.4 Results 
The primary goal of this study was to identify areas of the brain showing stronger 
hemodynamic responses, when playing for more preferred brands. We further 
examined whether distinct neural networks process reward information in the 
anticipation phase and the outcome phase of won trials. The following results 
represent the first order term in the parametric analyses. 
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Regions exhibiting preference-modulated neural responses during the 
anticipation phase  
In the prospect phase, hemodynamic responses linearly increasing with higher 
subjective preference were identified in right anterior insula / lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC), left pallidum / nucleus accumbens, bilateral premotor cortex, 
supplementary motor area, right supramarginal gyrus, primary somatosensory cortex 
and bilateral precuneus. (Figure 2, Table 1). 
 
Figure 2. Neural activity in brain regions linearly modulated by the brand preference 
(i.e., showing greater activity for more preferred brands) during the anticipation 
phase (p < .001 uncorrected): (A) right hemispheric anterior insula. (B) Left nucleus 
accumbens. (C) Predominantly right hemispheric premotor cortex and supplementary 
motor area.  
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Table 1.  Clusters showing brand-preference-dependent activity during the 
anticipation phase. Clusters with an error probability of p < .001 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons are reported. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak 
voxels in each cluster (coordinates refer to MNI-space). All clusters written in bold 
letters are within a priori hypothesized regions and survive a significance threshold of 
p < .05 family wise error corrected for small volumes.  
Coordinates Neural activity in regions  Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value 
increasing linearly with subjective preference: 
 
Anterior insula  R 161 28 26 -2 4.98 
Superior frontal gyrus R 41 38 44 26 5.21 
Middle frontal gyrus R 28 42 34 34 4.40 
Nucleus accumbens / ventral pallidum  L 121 -14 -4 -2 5.51 
Premotor cortex R 656 30 2 46 5.91 
Premotor cortex  L 340 -28 -4 56 5.41 
Premotor cortex, pre-SMA R 137 12 8 64 4.83 
pre - SMA, paracingulate gyrus L 53 -10 6 52 4.95 
Supramarginal gyrus R 100 56 -36 22 4.82 
Supramarginal gyrus R 32 48 -30 32 4.84 
Broca area L 36 -50 4 14 4.23 
Superior parietal lobe R 83 12 -54 66 4.82 
Primary somatosensory cortex R 112 32 -44 64 4.64 
Lingual gyrus L 51 -30 -56 -4 4.88 
Precuneus L 103 -8 -46 58 5.93 
Precuneus R 53 10 -74 42 3.84 
Regions exhibiting preference-modulated neural responses during the outcome 
phase of won trials  
In the outcome phase of won trials, clusters of voxels in the anterior prefrontal cortex 
and anterior cingulate cortex (subgenual part) increased their hemodynamic response 
linearly with higher subjective preference for the reward (Figure 3, Table 2).  
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Figure 3. Brain regions responding in correlation with preferences (i.e., showing 
greater activity for more preferred brands) during the outcome phase of won trials (p 
< .001 uncorrected). (A) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), (B) mesial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). 
Table 2. Clusters with a significant activity of p < .001 uncorrected for whole brain 
multiple comparisons are reported. The coordinates and t-values are at the peak 
voxels in each cluster (coordinates refer to MNI-space). All clusters written in bold 
letters are within a priori hypothesized regions and survive a significance threshold of 
p < .05 family-wise error corrected for small volumes.  
Coordinates Neural activity of regions  Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value 
increasing linearly with subjective preference: 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L 163 -26 50 24 5.64 
Mesial prefrontal cortex R 16 2 44 2 4.27 
 
5.2.5 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to replicate and strengthen the findings of our previous 
study [7] that explored brain areas responding to rewards differing in subjective value. 
For this purpose, we used sneaker brands as rewards that differed in subjective 
attractiveness, following the hypothesis that brands have the power to modulate the 
subjectively perceived value. In line with the results of our former study, we were 
able to demonstrate that playing for more preferred rewards compared with less 
preferred rewards induces increased neural activation in structures commonly linked 
to reward processing. Results furthermore suggest the proposed distinction between 
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anticipatory and evaluative aspects of reward processing [14]. Thus, results seem to 
generalize across different reward categories. In addition, we could show, that 
increasing one’s chance of obtaining a reward elicits neural activity comparable to 
winning primary reinforcers or accumulating monetary rewards. 
Anticipation phase 
“The anticipation of a reward is thought to lead to motivated behaviour through a 
series of steps originating in the limbic system and terminating in the motor system” 
[16]. Our results revealed neural structures along this pathway. Thus, the increase of 
the incentive value of the sports shoes induced by more preferred compared with less 
preferred brands is reflected by enhanced activity of neural structures commonly 
associated with reward processing.  
While participants were waiting for the outcome of the spinning wheel-of-fortune, 
hemodynamic responses in the left ventral striatum were linearly associated with 
subjectively perceived reward value. The ventral striatum is known to be involved in 
the prediction of rewards in terms of expected reward value and expected reward 
probability [17]. Given that in this study, between-trials reward probability was held 
constant across trials (p = 0.5), the preference-modulated activation of the ventral 
striatum likely reflects the augmented value that a more favoured brand adds to an 
expected reward. In a majority of studies that have used monetary reinforcers, a 
similar relation between neural activity and reward magnitude has been reported [18]. 
In contrast, a study of Elliott et al. (2003) [13] showed a non-graded striatal response 
to varying monetary rewards. This contradictory finding might be due to the fact that 
reward anticipation and reward outcome were not modelled as separate conditions but 
analyzed in a blocked design. It was shown previously that this distinction is 
important: Using single cell recordings in primates’ midbrain dopaminergic neurons, 
Tobler et al. (2005) [19] , for example, demonstrated that the spiking response to a 
reward cue is sensitive to the magnitude of the expected reward value but not the 
response to the reward outcome. In line with this finding, Cromwell and Schultz 
(2003) [20] reported a monotonic relationship between discharge rates of primate 
striatal neurons and expected reward magnitudes. Thus, we assume that the activation 
in the ventral striatum in our study reflects expectancies concerning the predicted, 
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forthcoming reward value and clearly indicates that this value is modulated by the 
subjective value associated with specific brands. 
Our analysis further revealed a cluster in the right anterior insula to respond to the 
subjective value of the rewards played for. While activity in the insula has been 
traditionally associated with negative emotional states, arising in response to aversive 
stimuli such as facial expressions of disgust [21], pain [22] or monetary losses [23] it 
is also reliably responding to monetary gains [24] and appetitive processing [25]. In 
addition, results of recent lesion studies demonstrated that smokers with damage to 
the insular cortex no longer experience conscious urges to smoke after quitting, 
suggesting that the insular cortex is a key structure in the perception of bodily needs 
that provides direction to motivated behaviours [26]. Taking the above mentioned 
findings of previous studies into account we cannot definitely answer the question 
whether reward value dependent insular activity can be attributed to positive emotions 
in the anticipation phase. It is equally conceivable that the preference-modulated 
activity in the anterior insula may be due to the potential risk of reward omission 
which probably is regarded as more negative in case of more preferred brands. 
In addition to the ventral striatum and the insula, a monotonic reward-value dependent 
increase of the hemodynamic responses was registered bilaterally in the premotor 
cortex and pre-SMA. Given that reward delivery did not depend on an instrumental 
motor response (such as grasping for a reward), processes of motor preparation or 
motor execution [27] cannot explain this finding. Instead, premotor activity and pre-
SMA activity may represent an increased state of motor preparedness, which may be 
the result of action-inducing characteristics of incentive stimuli. It is likely that the 
premotor cortex activity and pre-SMA activity reflect motivational modulation of 
motor signals corresponding to the value of a reward (i.e., increased motor 
preparedness for more desired rewards), as previously shown in primate single cell 
studies [16] and human brain imaging studies [7, 13, 18].  
Outcome Phase 
In each trial, when the wheel of fortune game stopped, the participants were informed 
as to whether they had won or not. In trials in which participants won, hemodynamic 
responses in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were stronger for more 
preferred brands. This is line with the findings of McClure et al. (2004) [9], showing 
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that participants’ previously expressed brand preferences influenced neural activity in 
the DLPFC during subsequent consumption of soft drinks. The DLPFC is understood 
to play an integrative role in cognitive control [28] and short-term memory processing 
[29]. Additionally, results from studies with patients with major depressive disorders  
and patients with DLPFC lesions [30] suggest an involvement in affective and 
motivational processing.  
Hemodynamic responses in the mesial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) also correlated 
with brand preferences in the outcome phase. A large number of studies reported 
increased hemodynamic responses in the VMPFC when participants received 
information about gains compared with no gains or losses. This holds for primary 
reinforcers, such as drinks [9] and for secondary reinforcers, such as money[14]. 
Knutson and Peterson therefore propose that the MPFC tracks the experienced utility 
of rewards [31]. Furthermore, MPFC activations were found irrespective of whether 
the rewards were consumed immediately (e.g. liquid food: [10]) or obtained after the 
experimental procedure (e.g., monetary rewards [12]). It should be noted that 
participants in our study did not accumulate money over trials, but could only increase 
the probability of winning a voucher of a given value for a particular brand. Thus, the 
reward value perceived in each winning trial of our study is affected by the subjective 
brand preference but also by reward probability defined as the number of won lottery 
tickets at a given point in time. To overcome the problem that people often experience 
difficulties with cognitively processing probabilities [32], probabilities were 
represented by frequencies (of lottery tickets) in our study, which are easier to 
understand [33]. But despite the more abstract reward scheme, our results are 
comparable to those of studies in which guaranteed monetary rewards were collected 
[34]. Thus, the results seem to hold regardless of whether expected reward value is 
manipulated by changing the value of the outcome or by changing its probability. 
Besides its prominent role in processing the value of obtained rewards, MPFC 
activation has also been observed in the context of emotional arousal and 
introspection [35-37]. Overall, findings of past research and of the current study 
indicate that the MPFC is involved in the evaluation of reward-magnitude and 
reward–valence, largely independent from sensory modality and the degree of 
abstraction.  
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Differences to the findings of the study of Koeneke et al. 2008  
One major goal of the present study was to replicate and extend previously reported 
findings of a study of our group [7]. The foremost modifications of the present study 
compared to the former implied an altered reward scheme (participants could increase 
reward probabilities rather than gain – as well as lose – rewards) and the use of 
different rewards (sneakers rather than chocolate bars). Overall, similar structures 
were inferred from the analysis, suggesting reliable activation of reward related brain 
structures to differentially valued rewards.  
In the previous study we did not find value-related activity in the ventral striatum. 
This incongruency to the present results is likely due to differing reward schemes. In 
the former study participants could subsequently win and lose rewards. Thus, the 
expected reward value might have been minimized because the probability to keep a 
once gained reward over the whole experiment was small. Supporting this notion, a 
recent fMRI study demonstrated that neural activity in the ventral striatum correlates 
with the expected probability for a reward [38]. In contrast, the reward scheme 
applied in the present study implied an irreversible accumulation of chance to win one 
out of three differentially preferred rewards. Each lot to be won represented an 
increase in chance over the whole experiment and therefore the perceived reward 
value was likely higher, than in the previous study. At the same time, the monetary 
value of the likely reward was higher (a voucher worth 150 SFr., won with a 
probability of p = 0.5 per brand, resulting in an overall win probability of p=0.875). 
Compared to the average gain of 10 chocolate bars in the previous study, the stakes 
were higher in the current study, which may have further contributed to strengthening 
the effects. 
In the present study participants could win vouchers for a pair of sneakers of a 
specifically preferred brand. Marketing in this product category mainly focuses on 
associating the brands with a certain lifestyle rather than advertising concrete product 
features [39]. In addition, up-market sneakers are similar in price, appearance and 
quality. Thus, we believe that the subjective values for the differentially preferred 
vouchers are predominantly culturally transferred. On the other hand, chocolate bars 
of different brands employed in the previous study possibly posed a less culturally 
influenced reward category. Preferences for chocolate might be more influenced by 
preferences in taste than the preference for the brand. Given, that in both studies, 
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highly similar structures of the brain (besides the ventral striatum) responded to 
differences in subjective value, it is conceivable that brain areas of the reward system 
generally respond according to perceived subjective values of rewards, irrespective of 
the reward stimulus category (eg. primary reinforcers such as tasty food, monetary 
rewards, or other secondary reinforcers with culturally transferred meaning) and the 
degree of abstraction of a reward (e.g. accumulating chances to gain a reward, 
accumulating rewards). 
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5.3 Experiment 2, Part 2: Differential Magnitude Coding of Gains and 
Omitted Rewards in the Nucleus Accumbens  
Andreas Pedroni1, Susan Koeneke1, Agne Velickaite1, Lutz Jäncke1 
1 University of Zurich, Institute of Psychology, Division Neuropsychology, Switzerland  
5.3.1 Summary 
Physiologic studies revealed that neurons in the dopaminergic midbrain of non-human 
primates encode reward prediction errors. It was furthermore shown that reward 
prediction errors are adaptively scaled with respect to the range of possible outcomes, 
enabling sensitive encoding for a large range of reward values. Congruently, 
neuroimaging studies in humans demonstrated that BOLD-responses in the ventral 
striatum encode reward prediction errors in similar fashion as dopaminergic midbrain 
neurons, suggesting that these BOLD-responses may be driven by dopaminergic 
midbrain activity. However, neuroimaging results are ambiguous with respect to the 
adaptive scaling of reward prediction errors, leading to the conjecture that under 
certain circumstances other than dopaminergic midbrain input may drive ventral 
striatal BOLD-responses. The goal of this study was to substantiate whether BOLD-
responses in the ventral striatum rather respond to adaptively scaled reward prediction 
errors or absolute reward magnitude. In addition, we aimed to identify neuronal 
structures modulating activity in the ventral striatum. Sixteen healthy participants 
played a wheel of fortune game, where they could win three differently valued 
rewards while being scanned. BOLD-responses increased after gaining rewards; this 
gain was however independent of the absolute reward magnitude. In contrast BOLD-
responses upon reward omission decreased with reward magnitude. A 
psychophysiological interaction analysis identified a cluster in the brainstem in 
proximity of the dorsal raphe nucleus, a cluster in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and 
a cluster in the rostral cingulate zone. These clusters changed their connectivity with 
the ventral striatum in relation to the absolute reward magnitude in reward omission 
trials. 
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5.3.2 Introduction 
Seminal experiments have demonstrated that dopaminergic midbrain cell firing 
patterns are related to reward processing, in particular to the encoding of the 
difference between expected reward and experienced reward, thus represent reward 
prediction errors (RPE) (for a review see Schultz, 2000). It has been shown that 
RPE’s are modulated by means of the expected probability, delay of occurrence and 
the magnitude of the reward (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; 
Tobler et al., 2005). It has been furthermore demonstrated that dopaminergic RPE-
signals are scaled with respect to known alternatives (Tobler et al., 2005). 
Specifically, the authors established that when three cues predicted pairs of rewards of 
different magnitudes, the better outcome always elicits the same positive reward 
prediction error signal, irrespective of the absolute reward magnitude. This scheme 
also applies to negative outcomes that are followed by the same negative RPE-signal. 
As a consequence of this “gain adaptation” the neural response discriminates equally 
well between two potential outcomes, regardless of their absolute differences in 
magnitude. In this manner, the ability to sensitively encode rewards is maintained 
over a large range of reward values (Tobler et al., 2005). 
A recent study of Bunzeck et al., (2010) investigated adaptive coding of RPE’s in 
humans using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Similar as in the study 
of Tobler et al. (2005) subjects were presented three different cues, which predicted 
two rewards with different magnitude but identical probability. They could elegantly 
demonstrate that (blood oxygenation level dependent) BOLD-responses in common 
target areas of the dopaminergic midbrain such as the ventral striatum reflect scaled 
adaptive coding of reward prediction errors, such that irrespective of the difference of 
the absolute magnitude, the better outcome elicits the same increase in BOLD 
response compared to the lesser outcome. Thus, it was shown that BOLD-responses in 
the ventral striatum encode reward magnitudes with respect to the known alternatives 
and not at an absolute scale. Many other studies investigated BOLD-responses to 
differentially rewarding (and punishing) outcomes, although not with the specific goal 
to investigate “gain adaptation”. If different rewards (which are fully known to the 
subject) can be won or lost, prediction errors should be scaled to the absolute 
difference between winning and losing, and hence BOLD-responses in the ventral 
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striatum should not differ between the absolute magnitudes of different rewards. In 
contrast to this notion, a number of studies reported reward magnitude dependent 
hemodynamic responses in the ventral striatum (e.g. Rolls et al., 2008; Yacubian et 
al., 2006), whereas others showed magnitude independent differences between 
favorable and unfavorable outcomes (e.g. Delgado et al., 2003, Elliott, 2003; Bunzeck 
et al., 2010). One plausible explanation for the discrepancy between results could be 
that task specific differences impede “gain-adaptation”. Alternatively, depending on 
the experimental task, the BOLD signal itself may be driven by different sources of 
neuronal activity. 
Current standard of knowledge is that the BOLD signal is most strongly related to 
synaptic current; therefore, it may reflect afferent input to neuron populations and/or 
local intrinsic processing (e.g. Logothetis et al., 2001; Viswanathan and Freeman, 
2007). Looking at the ventral striatum, BOLD-responses are suggested to arise from 
stimulation of postsynaptic D1 receptors through dopamine release as inferred from a 
pharmacological MRI study (Knutson and Gibbs, 2007). Significantly correlating 
BOLD-responses between the ventral tegmental area and the ventral striatum in 
response to reward prediction errors (D'Ardenne et al., 2008) and dopamine release in 
both structures (Schott et al., 2008) corroborate the idea of dopaminergic midbrain-
driven BOLD-responses in the ventral striatum. Furthermore, at the level of single-
unit activity reward prediction errors are generally not seen in the ventral striatum 
(Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008), thus arguing against intrinsically driven BOLD-
responses. Nonetheless, a proportion of neurons in the ventral striatum signal the 
value of rewards and cues that predict reward (Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008). 
Congruently, in some neuroimaging studies the BOLD signal in the ventral striatum 
correlates with reward magnitude (Tanaka et al., 2004, McClure et al., 2004) and not 
reward magnitude dependent prediction errors. Thus, the BOLD signal in the ventral 
striatum might reflect cortical input or intrinsic activity if reward absolute reward 
magnitudes are correlated, whereas it might reflect dopaminergic input if reward 
prediction errors are related to hemodynamic responses (Daw and Doya, 2006). 
In the present study we aimed to explore, whether reward and omission of reward of 
subjectively different magnitude modulates BOLD-responses in the ventral striatum. 
If BOLD-responses are scaled to the magnitude of rewards, we speculate that other 
than dopaminergic midbrain input may modulate the BOLD signal. To further test this 
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hypothesis we use psychophysiological interaction analysis to derive the neuronal 
sources of such putative variations.  
 
5.3.3 Results 
Voxel-wise analysis 
 
We conducted a whole brain analysis that examined significant activity in the ventral 
striatum for the four conditions of interest (AnR1, 2, 3 AR1, 2, 3 OwR1, 2, 3 OnwR1, 2, 3); 
we then compared these results to the analogue conditions, in which participants 
played for no rewards (AnRn, ARn, OwRn, OnwRn). See Table 1 for a description of 
contrasts and conditions.  
 
Table 1. Contrasts of the first level analysis, testing for activity in the ventral striatum. 
 
Contrasts 
[AnR1, AnR2, AnR3 ] > AnRn 
[AR1, AR2, AR3 ] > ARn 
[OwR1, OwR2, OwR3] > OwRn 
[OnwR1, OnwR2, OnwR3] < OnwRn 
Description  
An: Announcement 
A: Anticipation phase 
Ow: Outcome phase (won trials) 
Onw: Outcome phase (not won trials) 
Rx: Reward magnitude  
(1 = high, 2 = intermediate, 3 = low) 
Rn: no Reward 
 
Significantly more ventral striatal activity was found in the anticipation phase when 
playing for rewards compared to no rewards with clear bilateral activation (MNI: -10, 
16, -6, t =5.77, p < 0.001; MNI: 10, 10, -10, t =7.33, p < 0.001, complete list of 
clusters: Table 2). There was no significant difference in ventral striatal activity 
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between rewards and no rewards during the won outcome phases. Similarly, no 
significant differences were found in response to the announcement of differently 
rewarded trials. However, activity in the ventral striatum was significantly smaller 
when participants did not win a potential reward compared to not winning in a no-
reward control trial (bilateral NAcc, (MNI: -8, 12, -10, t = 5.52, p< 0.001; MNI: 14, 
12, -10, t = 4.56, 0.001, complete list of clusters: Table 3).  
 
Table 2. Group maximum t-values and MNI coordinates of fMRI activity during the 
anticipation [AR1, AR2, AR3] > AnRn (p < 0.001 uncorrected, cluster size > 30 voxels). 
 
Coordinates Region Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value p < 
Brainstem R 3911 12 -26 -10 7.46 0.001 
    Pallidum L  -14 -6 -6 5.34 0.001 
    Caudate L  -8 4 0 5.60 0.001 
    Accumbens L  -10 16 -6 5.77 0.001 
    Accumbens R  10 10 -10 7.33 0.001 
    Caudate R  10 4 2 6.63 0.001 
Superior frontal gyrus R 1070 24 -8 56 7.32 0.001 
Thalamus R 120 18 -22 12 7.16 0.001 
Lateral occipital 
cortex, superior 
division 
L 924 -12 -66 62 4.62 0.001 
Middle frontal gyrus L 1282 -28 -4 48 6.72 0.001 
Supramarginal gyrus L 153 -46 -34 36 6.37 0.001 
Superior parietal 
lobule  R 861 22 -56 56 6.30 0.001 
Postcentral gyrus R 216 32 -34 46 6.05 0.001 
Frontal pole R 114 46 44 24 5.73 0.001 
Lateral occipital 
cortex, inferior 
division 
R 463 42 -66 -2 5.56 0.001 
Frontal pole R 146 34 52 10 5.34 0.001 
Lateral occipital 
cortex, superior 
division 
L 87 -32 -70 14 5.09 0.001 
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Table 3: Group maximum t-values and MNI coordinates of fMRI “deactivation” after 
the omission of rewards [OnwR1, OnwR2, OnwR3] < OnwRn (p < 0.001 uncorrected, 
cluster size > 30 voxels). 
 
Coordinates Region Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) X Y Z 
t-value p < 
Superior frontal gyrus L 214 -20 22 60 5.73 0.001 
Accumbens L 92 -8 12 -10 5.52 0.001 
Accumbens, 
Putamen 
R 33 14 12 -10 4.56 0.001 
 
 
Region of interest analysis  
Anticipation phase 
Analysis of individual FIR time-courses during the anticipation phase (Fig. 1, A) 
(duration 10 - 12s) extracted from the bilateral NAcc ROI yielded a significant 
interaction of condition (3) x epoch (10), (F (3.9, 47.4) = 2.636, p < 0.0046), 
indicating that certain conditions differed significantly over time. Post hoc paired t-
tests at the time-point of the highest peak of the signal (12.5s) revealed significant 
differences between R1 (high reward magnitude) and R3 (low reward magnitude) (t 
(df=12) = 4.228, p< 0.001), and a strong trend for differences between R1 and R2 
(intermediate reward magnitude) (t  (df=12) = 1.759, p<0.0502). 
Outcome won 
No significant activity within the ventral striatum was found for the outcome phase of 
rewarding won trials (Fig. 1, B) when compared to non-rewarding won trials in the 
whole brain analysis. Nevertheless, a repeated measure ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of the factor epoch (10), (F (2.456, 24.563) = 9.066, p< 0.001) 
but no significant interaction between condition (3) and epoch (10); thus, indicating 
that the signal time courses changed significantly over time without differing between 
conditions. A post hoc single sample t-test at the peak of the mean of all signal time 
courses indicated a significant increase in signal change (t (df=10) = 3.404, p<0.007)). 
The FIR time course of the won, although not rewarded, trials indicated a strong trend 
in differing at the onset of the outcome phase and differed significantly, that is, 2.5s 
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thereafter from the time courses of mean of all rewarded conditions (0s=(t (df=10) = 
2.457, p<0.034), 2.5s=(t (df=10) = 3.106, p<0.01). This indicates that the 
hemodynamic response started in not rewarded trials at lower levels, compared to 
rewarded trials.  
Outcome not won 
The analysis of individual FIR time-courses during the outcome phase of not won 
trials (Fig. 1, C) (duration 3s) extracted from the bilateral NAcc ROI, yielded a 
significant interaction of condition (3) x epoch (10), (F (4.815, 67.411) = 3.2, p < 
0.013); therefore, indicating that particular conditions differed significantly over time. 
Post-hoc paired t-tests at the time-point of the most negative signal change (R1 = 10 s, 
R2 = 7.5 s, R3 = 10 s) revealed significant differences between R1 and R3 (t (df=14) = 
4.006, p < 0.001), as well as a trend for significant differences between R2 and R3 (t 
(df=14) = 2.383, p < 0.032). No significant difference was observed between R1 and 
R2 (t (df=14)= 1.521, p < 0.150). 
 
Figure 1. Event-related hemodynamic responses to different reward magnitudes. A, 
Hemodynamic responses during the anticipation phase are modulated by reward 
magnitude. B, Hemodynamic responses after rewarded outcomes are not influenced 
by reward magnitude. Averaged time-courses of all rewarded trials (dashed line) 
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exhibit significant differences to non-rewarded trials. C, After reward omission, signal 
time-courses significantly decrease in a reward magnitude-dependent fashion. (Note 
the different scalings in A,B and C).  
 
PPI of reward magnitude and the NAcc after not won outcomes  
 
We discovered that neural responses in the dorsal raphe nucleus (dRN), rostral 
cingulate zone (RCZ), in the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) covaried more 
negatively with neural activity in the NAcc as a function of the magnitude of omitted 
rewards (Table 4). The precise localization of dRN activation is difficult to ascertain 
with standard MRI techniques. However, previous imaging studies have identified the 
dorsal raphe nucleus within close range to the cluster in the brainstem, which was 
found in our study (Lanzenberger et al., 2009; Tanaka et al., 2004). A repeated 
measures ANOVA (p < 0.05) with factors preference levels (3) x cluster location (3) 
was performed using the mean of the estimated beta weights; it revealed a significant 
main effect for the factor preference levels (F (101.7, 1.67) = 5.69, p = 0.007). Post-
hoc paired t-tests of the beta estimates in the dRN indicated a trend for significant 
differences between R1 and R2 (t (df=61) = 2.144, p < 0.036) and R1 and R3 (t (df=61) 
= 2.802, p< 0.0035). With regard to the beta estimates of the lOFC cluster, post-hoc 
paired t-tests revealed a trend for significant differences between R1 and R2 (t (df=61) 
= 1.9962, p < 0.051) and R1 and R3 (t (df=61) = 3.038, p < 0.004,). Mean beta 
estimates of the RCZ cluster showed a trend for significant differences between 
conditions R1 and R3 (t (df=61) = 2.184, p < 0.033) and significant differences 
between R2 and R3 (t (df=61) =3.401, p < 0.002) (Fig. 2). 
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Table 4. Brain areas showing significant negative changes in connectivity at p < 0.001 
uncorrected, cluster size > 30 voxels, except for the Dorsal raphe nucleus (cluster size 
> 10). 
Coordinates Region (Negative PPI) Right/ 
Left 
Cluster 
Size 
(Voxels) 
X Y Z 
t-value p < 
Rostral cingulate 
zone 
- 
545 0 34 12 7.39 0.001 
Lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex 
R 341 34 28 -22 6.06 0.001 
Dorsal raphe nucleus L 16 -2 -32 -16 3.73 0.001 
 
 
 
Figure 2. PPI results. A, Brain structures significantly changing co-activity with 
NAcc as an inverse function of reward magnitude (voxel height threshold: p < 0.001, 
voxel extent threshold, p < 0.05 family-wise error (FWE) corrected, lOFC, lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex, RCZ, rostral cingulate zone, dRN, dorsal Raphe nucleus (cluster 
extent threshold > 10 voxel)). B, Mean beta estimates of the NAcc ROI - PPI 
regressors. Positive values indicate positively correlating co-activity, whereas 
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negative values indicate negatively correlating co-activity. Asterisks indicate 
significant differences * (p < 0.05, one-sided, corrected for multiple comparisons). A 
trend for a significant difference is indicated by asterisks within brackets (*) (p < 
0.05, one sided, uncorrected for multiple comparisons). 
 
5.3.4 Discussion 
 
The goal of this study was to examine whether BOLD-responses in the ventral 
striatum might be mainly driven by RPE-related neuronal activity in the dopaminergic 
midbrain or neuronal activity, related to absolute magnitude coding. We used 
individual ratings of rewards and associated these to Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) 
activity to assure that rewards truly differ in the subjectively perceived magnitude. 
Our analysis focused on the NAcc, since this part of the ventral striatum was most 
consistently activated across experimental conditions. Furthermore, we employed a 
NAcc probability map, in order to circumvent the problem of non-independence 
between analysis levels.  
Amplitudes of BOLD-responses in the NAcc reflected the expected reward magnitude 
while subjects were anticipating rewards. This is in line with previous studies, 
indicating magnitude dependent reward prediction error signals in the dopaminergic 
midbrain (e.g. Tobler et al., 2005) and ventral striatum (e.g. Knutson et al., 2001, 
Delgado et al., 2003). The same area exhibited BOLD-responses during reward 
delivery and was unaffected by reward magnitude; thus, supporting the previously 
reported effect of reward prediction error “gain adaptation” (Tobler et al., 2005, 
Bunzeck et al., 2010). We further identified significant negative deviations in BOLD-
responses in the NAcc after the omission of rewards. Interestingly, this decrease in 
BOLD-responses was found to be magnitude-dependent. This finding argues in favor 
of reward magnitude coding at an absolute scale for the case of reward omission. A 
psychophysiological interaction analysis implies that the differences in BOLD-
responses, related to the magnitude of omissions are predominantly driven by other 
structures than the dopaminergic midbrain.   
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Reward anticipation 
 
During the anticipation phase, there was a clear difference in hemodynamic responses 
in trials in which rewards could be anticipated compared with control trials without 
reward. Furthermore, at the peak of the signal change curve (12.5 s after spinning 
wheel onset) significant differences were evident between large and intermediate 
reward magnitude and large and small reward magnitude, but not between 
intermediate and small reward magnitude. Thus, this finding of reward magnitude-
dependent activity in the ventral striatum during anticipation is consistent with 
previous imaging studies (Breiter et al., 2001; Galvan et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 
2001a) reporting a general albeit not necessarily linear dependence of reward 
magnitude and ventral striatal activity. It is noteworthy that the observed effect of 
anticipatory reward magnitude coding may be conceptualized as a magnitude 
dependent reward prediction error signal. Since subjects did not know the exact 
moment of the beginning of a trial (random inter-trial-interval), the presentation of the 
reward-predicting cue reflects a prediction error, which is scaled to the magnitude of 
the probable forthcoming reward. The observed response pattern complies with 
reward prediction error-dependent dopaminergic midbrain-spiking patterns evidenced 
in non-human primates during the anticipation of different rewards (Tobler et al., 
2005; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005). This suggests strong dopaminergic innervation of 
the ventral striatum. 
A substantial difference between Tobler et al.’s (2005) study and our study was the 
longer delay between reward predicting stimulus and reward (11.5 – 16 s in our study 
compared to approximately 2 s in Tobler’s study). We initially expected 
hemodynamic responses to the onset of the announcement of the reward. However, 
our analysis did not indicate significant responses to this reward-predicting stimulus. 
This lack of finding may be due to decreases in dopaminergic response in relation to 
expected longer delays of rewards as reported by Kobayashi and Schultz (2008). 
Nevertheless, as dopamine responses have been frequently observed to generalize to 
stimuli resembling reward predictors (Ljungberg et al., 1991; Schultz and Romo, 
1990) the late peaking hemodynamic response in the ventral striatum could reflect a 
later reward-predicting cue. This cue might be the slowing of the wheel of fortune; it 
likely represents a more salient and temporally closer predictor for future reward. 
Future studies will be necessary to better understand the influence of different delays 
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between cues and rewards on the signal time course of hemodynamic signals in the 
ventral striatum, as well as spike signaling of dopaminergic neurons.  
 
Outcome won 
 
The analysis of event-related FIR time-courses of rewarded outcome trials indicates a 
significant signal change in the NAcc with a BOLD-response characteristic that could 
possibly reflect activity in relation to the processing of positive RPE’s. Unlike the 
reward magnitude-dependent responses in the ventral striatum during anticipation, the 
FIR time-courses did not differ between absolute reward magnitudes after rewarded 
outcomes. The fact that signal time courses gradually increased irrespective of reward 
magnitude lends support to the previously reported effect of “gain-adaptation” of 
RPEs (Tobler et al., 2005, Bunzeck et al., 2010). In these two studies, subjects 
(humans and non-human primates) were presented three cues predicting pairs of 
rewards of different magnitude. They could nicely demonstrate that the pattern of 
prediction errors is adaptively scaled with respect to the possible alternatives. In other 
words, winning vs. not winning a reward always elicits the same neuronal response, 
independently of the absolute magnitude. In contrast, in our study, to play for a 
reward of specific magnitude always meant that this reward could be won or not won. 
Similarly as in the studies of Tobler et al. (2005) and Bunzeck et al. (2010) the range 
of outcomes was known. Thus, a positive RPE (e.g. winning) may normalize to the 
absolute difference between two outcomes (e.g. gain of a large reward vs. omission of 
a large reward), thereby resulting in a magnitude-indifferent increase in hemodynamic 
response. However, deducing this interpretation from the non-finding of differences is 
obviously problematic from a statistical point of view.  
Regarding previous research, a number of studies did find reward magnitude 
dependent hemodynamic responses in the ventral striatum (Rolls et al., 2008; 
Yacubian et al., 2006). Other studies showed magnitude independent differences 
between favorable and unfavorable outcomes (e.g. Delgado et al., 2003, Elliott et al., 
2003; Bunzeck et al., 2010). The discrepancy between the results might be explained 
by differences in the experimental tasks. For instance, in the study of Rolls et al., 
(2008) and Yacubian et al., (2006) subjects could choose between alternatives with 
different reward magnitude in combination with different reward probabilities. The 
outcome was always probabilistic and hence the needed knowledge about alternative 
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outcomes for reward prediction gain adaptation was possibly not met. In contrast, in 
the studies of Delgado et al., 2003, Elliott et al., 2003 and Bunzeck et al., 2010 only 
two known alternative outcomes per trial were possible, thus RPE-gain adaptation 
was possibly feasible. In addition, lending further support to our interpretation, there 
exists general agreement that the human reward system largely encodes reward values 
in relation to possible outcomes and not on an absolute scale (De Martino et al., 2009; 
Elliott et al., 2008; Fujiwara et al., 2009; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). 
 
Outcome not won 
 
Our findings reveal that hemodynamic responses upon reward omission gradually 
decrease in relation to the reward magnitude. This is in contrast to the hypothesis of 
gain-adaptation, which also applies to negative prediction errors, as shown in 
midbrain dopamergic firing rates which were also scaled to the difference between 
alternative outcomes and thus did not differentiate between the absolute magnitudes 
of outcomes (Tobler et al., 2005). In light of this and the finding of magnitude 
independent BOLD-responses after gaining rewards, our result of a reward 
magnitude-dependent decrease in BOLD-response was surprising. However, 
alternatively to spike-frequency reward prediction error magnitude coding in the 
dopaminergic midbrain, which is anyway limited in the case of spiking depression in 
response to negative prediction errors, RPE-magnitude-dependent graded responses in 
dopaminergic midbrain neurons have been reported in terms of the duration of the 
below base-rate spiking depression (Bayer et al., 2007). This may have affected 
BOLD-responses in synaptic target regions, such as, the NAcc. However, it is not yet 
clear how longer suppression influences the amplitude of negative hemodynamic 
responses.  
Compared to the hemodynamic response after won outcomes the negative BOLD 
response peaked 2.5-5 s later. The physiological meaning of the latency of BOLD-
responses is only scarcely investigated but it has been conjectured that prolonged 
neuronal activity would produce both larger and relatively delayed peaking of the 
BOLD response (Henson et. al., 2002). Adopting this idea to later peaking negative 
BOLD-responses could indicate that reward omissions elicit longer deactivations in 
the ventral striatum after reward omissions, compared to activation due to gains. 
However, to our knowledge, latency effects of negative hemodynamic responses have 
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not yet been investigated and it is therefore impossible to draw conclusions on this 
difference.  
Rather than the dopaminergic system, it may be the serotonergic system (e.g., the 
dorsal raphe nucleus (dRN)) that sends strong projections to the ventral striatum 
(Azmitia and Segal, 1978) and influences the encoding of negative RPE; thereby, 
affecting the graded decrease in hemodynamic signal in the NAcc. However, evidence 
that phasic serotonergic signaling drives negative RPEs has only been deduced from 
computational models (Daw et al., 2002) so far and has yet to be proven 
physiologically.  
 
Psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI) 
 
In order to explore which structures modulate the graded negative responses in the 
NAcc, we performed a psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI) isolating those 
structures that change their functional connectivity to the NAcc as an inverse function 
of reward magnitude in reward omission trials. The analysis revealed, that activity in 
the brainstem, possibly the dorsal Raphe nucleus (dRN), rostral cingulate zone (RCZ), 
and in the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) covaries with neural activity in the 
NAcc as the magnitude of the omitted reward increases.  
Experiments conducted with monkeys have suggested a strong interaction between 
the dopaminergic and serotonergic system. For example, it has been shown that the 
serotonin system, which originates in the dRN, inhibits dopaminergic function in the 
midbrain (Dray and Straughan, 1976; Trent and Tepper, 1991), as well as at the 
terminal dopaminergic fields, namely, the NAcc and striatum (Kapur and Remington, 
1996). Further evidence for a mechanism, which subserves serotonin's inhibitory 
effect on dopamine, comes from an electrophysiological study by Jones and Kauer 
(1999), demonstrating that the excitatory glutamatergic synaptic transmission onto 
VTA neurons is depressed through the activation of serotonin receptors. This is in 
contrast to the interaction between dRN activity and dopamine, and suggests their 
involvement in the processing of negative prediction errors. Recent studies have 
revealed that dRN neurons respond to expected and received rewards (Nakamura et 
al., 2008; Lanzenberger et al., 2009), as well as to the evaluation of delayed rewards 
(Tanaka et al., 2004). In view of this, we can only conjecture that the dRN “down-
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regulates” (probably through serotonergic input) activity in the NAcc, which may 
account for the graded decreases in hemodynamic responses.  
An important role in monitoring the rewarding features of stimuli is attributed to the 
OFC because of its extensive multisensory connections (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 
2006; Walton et al., 2004). More specifically, the lateral OFC receives input from 
visual areas (Ongur and Price, 2000), and it is active during evaluation of punishing 
stimuli (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Seymour et al., 2005). Prominent projections 
from the lateral OFC to the NAcc (Haber et al., 1995) provide further support for the 
concept of a modulating impact produced by the lateral OFC on the NAcc. We 
suggest that after receiving sensory information about a punishing event, the lateral 
OFC evaluates this information in terms of its rewarding value and subsequently 
down-regulates activity in the NAcc and dopaminergic midbrain structures.  
The RCZ is often co-active with the lateral OFC during evaluation of negatively 
valued events (Kringelbach, 2005). As shown in non-human primates, these two 
structures maintain strong anatomical interconnections (Ongur and Price, 2000), 
suggesting that they operate as a linked pair (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2003). The RCZ 
also receives projections from limbic structures, such as, the ventral striatum 
(Kunishio and Haber, 1994) and amygdala (Barbas and De Olmos, 1990); it generally 
represents a main target area of the mesocortical dopamine system, which originates 
in the ventral tegmental area (Gaspar et al., 1989). It has been previously suggested 
that pyramidal cells in the RCZ are disinhibited by phasic decreases of mesencephalic 
dopaminergic inputs, which result in error related negativity (ERN), that is a negative 
deflection in the ongoing electroencephalogram (EEG) emerging when humans 
evaluate events, which are inconsistent with their expectations (Holroyd and Coles, 
2002). In line with this theory, Münte et al., (2007) conducted a study employing 
simultaneous intraoperative recordings and EEG in an awake human patient. These 
researchers found decreases in the local field potential within the NAcc, which were 
highly correlated to the ERN signal in the EEG recordings. Furthermore, they showed 
that the error-related activity in the NAcc precedes the ERN by 40 ms; thus, 
suggesting a directional influence of the NAcc to the RCZ. In our experiment, if a 
highly preferred reward was not obtained, then it represented a more relevant 
violation of what had been expected, in contrast with the omission of a less preferred 
reward. Neurons in the RCZ may process this violation and trigger the subsequent 
(re)formation of future expectations, this resulting in an outcome-based optimization 
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of forthcoming behavior. In our study, the participants had no means of influencing 
the outcome of the wheel of fortune game; therefore, they were unable to optimize 
future behavior. Nevertheless, this basal learning mechanism may be triggered 
irrespective of whether future behavior can be optimized on the basis of outcome.  
In conclusion, ventral striatal BOLD-responses during anticipation and after gain of 
different rewards exhibit response patterns of RPE’s as shown before (Tobler et al., 
2005; Bunzeck et al., 2010, Delgado et al., 2003). Thus, in these phases, the BOLD 
signal in the ventral striatum likely reflects predominantly ennervation of activity of 
the dopaminergic midbrain. In contrast to dopaminergic midbrain responses to the 
omission of rewards, hemodynamic responses were scaled to the absolute reward 
magnitude, suggesting that activity in the NAcc may be modulated through inputs of 
other than dopaminergic midbrain neurons. The PPI analysis used in our study has 
revealed that activity in the dRN, lateral OFC, and RCZ was negatively related to 
BOLD-deactivations in the NAcc in association with the omission of rewards of 
different magnitude. We suggest that the dRN and lateral OFC have a graded 
inhibitory effect on NAcc after reward omission whereas RCZ is disinhibited by the 
deactivation of neural activity in the NAcc. Intracranial recordings could possibly 
yield evidence for this proposal. 
5.3.5 Experimental Procedure 
Participants 
 
Sixteen healthy adult voluntary participants (9 female and 7 male, mean age of 24 ± 
4) were recruited from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, Switzerland. In 
contrast to previous studies, we manipulated reward magnitude on a subjective, 
individual scale; this required the selection of participants based on specific criteria. 
In our previous studies (Koeneke et al., 2008), we were able to show (1) that – within 
a certain product category, e.g., chocolate bars or sneakers – different brands can be 
arranged in a preference hierarchy for each individual and (2) that this individual 
brand preference hierarchy is reflected in the pattern of brain activity during a 
gambling paradigm. Neural structures whose activity was modulated by individual 
brand preferences were similar to structures identified in previous studies that 
manipulated the reward according to an objectively quantifiable scale, for example, 
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monetary rewards. The aspect of modulating reward values through brand preferences 
will be published elsewhere.  
Similar to our previous work, we used different product brands to represent various 
reward magnitudes in the present study. Determining the individual brand hierarchies 
required a detailed assessment of brand preferences embedded in a two-stage 
selection procedure. During the first stage, a paper and pencil questionnaire was 
distributed to students in different courses of the Psychology Department of the 
University of Zurich. Two-hundred students completed the questionnaire, from which 
50 respondents indicated that they (a) wore sneakers at least from time to time, (b) 
cared about sneakers, (c) cared about brands when it came to sneakers, and (d) 
expressed differentiated brand preferences in a constant sum point allocation “chip 
game” between different sneaker brands. These 50 respondents were invited to the 
second round. Twenty-seven of the pre-selected participants accepted the invitation 
and filled out a second, computer-based questionnaire that aimed to measure 
individual brand preferences in more detail with a choice-based procedure (the GfK 
Price Challenger, GPC, Wildner, 2003), and another constant sum chip game. Of 
those, 18 respondents were invited to our fMRI study. These participants expressed 
preferences that were consistent across the two measures and widely dispersed, in 
order to allow for clear brand differentiation. Two participants dropped out due to 
personal reasons. Based on the preference data gathered in the second stage of the 
selection procedure, three sneaker brands were determined for each subject: (1) 
her/his favorite brand (high reward: R1), (2) her/his least preferred yet still acceptable 
brand (low reward: R3), as well as (3) one intermediate brand (intermediate reward: 
R2) that ranked between the top and the bottom brand. Hence, reward magnitude in 
the present study had three parameter values.  
The local ethics committee approved our study and the research participants gave 
written informed consent. The tasks and testing procedures were in accordance with 
institutional guidelines and the study conformed to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Participation was compensated with 50.00 CHF, and if during the experiment a pair of 
sneakers was won, then research participants received a voucher worth 150 CHF.  
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Design and Procedure  
 
Participants played a virtual wheel-of-fortune game projected onto a translucent 
screen that could be viewed inside the scanner via a mirror. The experiment consisted 
of four runs with 25 trials each. Individual T1-weighted anatomic brain images were 
recorded after the actual experimental sessions. The total scanning time was 
approximately 50 minutes.  Before being scanned, participants were briefly informed 
about MRI / fMRI methodology; then each participant was instructed to (1) complete 
a questionnaire that tested for individual MR-suitability and (2) to give his / her 
informed consent. Next, participants were requested to read a short instruction 
manual, which explained the procedures of the experiment. Participants then 
completed two test trials of the wheel-of-fortune game outside the scanner, in order to 
assure that they had understood the task correctly.  The overall prize that could be 
won in our experiment was a voucher (worth 150 CHF) for a particular brand of 
sneakers. The subjects played for this voucher in a lottery, which took place after the 
scanning session. During the scanning session, the subjects were able to win lottery 
tickets that increased their chances of winning in the subsequent lottery. In other 
words, a won trial in the wheel-of-fortune game increased the probability of winning 
the voucher for a certain brand of sneakers.  
In each wheel-of-fortune trial, one out of 25 lottery tickets per brands could be won 
(i.e., 75 lottery tickets in total). Trials were brand-specific, meaning that a won trial 
increased the chances of winning a voucher for one specific brand (R1, R2 or R3), 
which was announced at the beginning of the trial. During the scanning session, the 
number of won lottery tickets for each brand was displayed. After the scanning 
session, the subjects were presented with three pots (one for each brand) that each 
contained 25 lottery tickets, with one lottery ticket being the joker. The subjects then 
drew the amount of won lottery tickets separately for each brand. If the joker was 
drawn, participants received the voucher for the particular brand. If more than one 
voucher was won, they could freely choose one to take home. The chance to win was 
pseudo-randomly varied at a chance of 50 percent. Thus, participants had the 
cumulative chance to win one of the three vouchers of 87.5 percent. The sequence of 
the brands the participants played for were pseudo-randomly distributed, to ensure 
enough trials of every possible combination (brand, outcome) for the analysis. In 
addition, 25 trials in which no lottery tickets could be won were randomly 
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interspersed in the experiment, in order to detect brain areas responding to the wheel-
of-fortune game itself; this resulted in a total of 100 trials.  
A trial consisted of a brand announcement phase (0.5 –2 s), a response phase (choice 
between green or red; 1-2 s), a prospect phase (wheel of fortune spins; 10-12 s), an 
outcome phase (outcome is presented; 3s), a blank screen with a fixation cross (4-5 s), 
a picture of the actual balance (2 s), and a blank screen with a fixation cross (6 s) (Fig. 
3). During the announcement phase, the logo of the brand that subjects were playing 
for in the current trial was presented in the center of a wheel-of-fortune that consisted 
of twelve colored (6 green and 6 red) fields.  During the response phase, participants 
could choose one color by pressing a button. The button-to-color assignment was kept 
constant across the trials. The chosen color field remained visible underneath the 
wheel while the other color field disappeared so that participants did not have to 
memorize their choice. The anticipation phase started with the wheel-of-fortune 
rotating and slowing down to a halt after 10-12 s. The wheel-of-fortune slowed down 
asymptotically, to simulate a realistic roulette-like game. The ensuing outcome-phase 
started after the wheel had stopped. The outcome achieved was indicated by a field 
that came to a halt under a pin at the top of the wheel, as well as by a text box (i.e., 
“You have won 1 lot / You have not won”). During the outcome-phase the logo at 
stake was still visible. A trial was won when the color chosen by the subject was 
consistent with the color of the field that came to a halt under the pin. To avoid 
participants memorizing account balances, the balance of the number of lottery tickets 
for the respective brand, which had been acquired thus far, was indicated in each trial. 
This number was also translated into the probability of winning a voucher and was 
represented as a bar chart. A blank screen with a fixation cross was presented for 6 s 
before the next trial started, in order to ensure that the fMRI signal could level back to 
a task-unspecific baseline.  
 
Figure 3. Experimental design of the wheel-of-fortune game. 
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fMRI acquisition 
 
A Philips Intera 3T whole-body MR unit (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The 
Netherlands), equipped with an eight-channel Philips SENSE head coil was used, to 
acquire magnetic resonance images. Anatomical images of the whole brain were 
obtained by using a T1-weighted three-dimensional, spoiled, gradient echo pulse 
sequence (repetition time (TR)=20 ms, echo time (TE)=2.30 ms, flip angle 20°, field 
of view (FOV)=220 mm, acquisition matrix=224 x 224, voxel size=1 mm x 1 mm 
0.75 mm, 180 slices, slice thickness=0.75 mm). Functional data for the behavioral 
tasks were obtained from 280 whole-head scans per run using a Sensitivity Encoded 
(SENSE) (Pruessmann et al., 1999) single-shot echoplanar imaging technique (TR = 
2500ms, TE = 35ms, flip angle = 78°, FOV = 220mm, acquisition matrix= 80 x 80, 33 
transverse slices, voxel size= 1.72 mm x 1.72 mm x 4 mm). 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Preprocessing 
 
Artifact elimination and MRI data analysis were performed using MATLAB 2006b 
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA), and the SPM5 software package 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5). The first three images were 
discarded, to allow for steady-state magnetization. All images were realigned to the 
first image of the first run, slice time corrected and spatially normalized into standard 
stereotactic MNI space (EPI template provided by the Montreal Neurological 
Institute), interpolated to a voxel size of 2 x 2 x 2 mm and spatially smoothed using a 
8-mm full-with-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
 
Voxel-wise analysis 
 
Whole brain analysis was performed using a general linear model as implemented in 
SPM5. The design matrix included regressors modeling the onsets and durations of 
the announcement phase, response phase, anticipation phase, the two possible types of 
outcome (won/ not won) and the actual balance. Separate regressors were introduced 
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for each preference level and the non-rewarding condition in the announcement phase, 
the anticipation phase, and the two outcome phases. The announcement, response and 
anticipation phases, as well as the blank screen between the outcome and balance 
varied in duration. Also, the time lag between motor response that occurred when 
choosing a color and at the onset of the anticipation phase (the start of the spinning of 
the wheel-of-fortune) was temporally jittered. This was implemented, since our aim 
was to temporally de-correlate two ensuing regressors and avoid inflation of variance; 
thereby, increasing model-sensitivity. The resulting regressors were convolved with 
SPM’s canonical difference of gamma hemodynamic response function. After high-
pass filtering (cut-off of 128 s), an individual statistical model was computed for each 
participant.  
The goal of the whole-brain analysis was to assure significant activity in the ventral 
striatum, in order to further analyze region-specific hemodynamic signal time courses. 
Thus, contrasts were calculated for the announcement, the anticipation phases, 
between R1, R2, R3 and the non-rewarding (Rn) trials, for the two outcomes (won/not 
won) R1, R2, R3 and the non-rewarding trials (Rn) (Table 1). To allow for a population 
level inference, the maps of contrast coefficients, which were controlled for random 
effects, were collectively submitted to one-sample t-tests against the null hypothesis 
of no activation.  
 
Regions of interest analysis 
 
Region of interest (ROI) analyses were performed using MARSBAR, the ROI toolbox 
for SPM; version 0.41 (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/), and SPSS (Rel. 16.0, SPSS). 
Since the NAcc (bilaterally) was found to be consistently activated within the ventral 
striatum, we chose the bilateral NAcc of the Harvard-Oxford subcortical probabilistic 
atlas, provided by the FSL Software Library (Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, UK, 
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/data/atlas-descriptions.html). We made this choice, 
instead of defining our ROI from activation patterns, because the former involves a 
risk that may have resulted in non-independence between test hierarchies. A finite 
impulse response (FIR) model was employed since we intended to extract event-
related time courses of each experimental condition (10 time bins of 2.5 s); thereby, 
calculating the best estimate of the fMRI signal for each scan after adjusting for other 
effects of the model.  
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The analysis targeted preference-dependent FIR signal time courses of the 
anticipation phase (A), the outcome phase of won trials (OW), and the outcome phase 
of not won trials (OnW). The resulting FIR-time courses, which were time-locked to 
the onsets of the three phases were analyzed by using a repeated-measures ANOVA 
(p < 0.05) with the within-subject factors:  preference-level (n=3) and epoch (n=10). 
If one single FIR values was above or below 3 * interquartile range, then FIR signal 
time courses of those subjects were excluded from the analysis. Average signal 
changes were compared across condition types at the time of positive or negative 
peaks (depending on the overall time-course) by using paired t – tests. Unless 
otherwise indicated, significance thresholds were set at p < 0.05 and Bonferroni-
corrected for the number of paired t-tests. 
 
Psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI) 
 
A psychophysiological interaction means that the connectivity of one area to another 
changes significantly in relation to an experimental variable (Friston et al., 1997). 
However, it should be kept in mind that PPI analyses do not inform us about 
causality. In our study, we aimed to reveal which neural structures may have 
influenced reward-magnitude-specific decreases in neural activity in the NAcc during 
the outcome phase of not won trials (OnW); subsequently, suggesting the role of 
inhibitory interactions. In order to accomplish this goal, individual time series were 
extracted from the bilateral NAcc ROI (which we also used for the standard ROI 
analyses) by using the first eigentimeseries (principal component). The PPI is defined 
as the interaction between the NAcc time series and the preference levels introduced 
as a first order parametric modulation in not won trials. To test for group effects, 
single-subject first-order parametric modulatory contrasts were subjected to a one-
way ANOVA. If clusters demonstrated significant connectivity (p < 0.001, voxel 
extent threshold, p < 0.05 family-wise-error (FWE) corrected), then mean beta 
weights of the clusters of the three different preference levels were extracted and 
further compared with paired t-tests. Because the dorsal Raphe nucleus (dRN) has 
been previously suggested to influence the negative prediction error signal in the 
ventral striatum, the cluster extent threshold was lowered to a cluster size of 10 voxels 
for the brainstem region surrounding the dRN.  
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5.4 Experiment 3: Topographic ERP Analysis of Reward Value- and Valence-
Coding  
Andreas Pedroni1, Nicolas Langer1, Lutz Jäncke1 
1 University of Zurich, Institute of Psychology, Division Neuropsychology, Switzerland  
 
5.4.1 Summary 
Economic theory distinguishes two concepts of utility: decision utility, objectively 
quantifiable by choices and experienced utility referring to the satisfaction by an 
obtainment. Up to date, experienced utility is typically measured with subjective 
ratings. This study intended to quantify experienced utility by global levels of 
neuronal activity. Neuronal activity was measured by means of 
electroencephalographic (EEG) responses to gain and omission of graded monetary 
rewards at the level of the EEG-topography in human subjects. A novel analysis 
approach allowed approximating psychophysiological value functions for the 
experienced utility of monetary rewards. In addition, we identified the time-windows 
of the ERP and the respective intracortical sources, where variations in neuronal 
activity were significantly related to the value or valence of outcomes. Results 
indicate that value functions of experienced utility and regret disproportionally 
increase with monetary value, thus contradict the compressing value functions of 
decision utility. The temporal pattern of outcome evaluation suggests an initial (~250 
ms) coarse evaluation regarding the valence, concurrent with a finer-grained 
evaluation of the value of gained rewards, whereas the evaluation of the value of 
omitted rewards emerges later. We hypothesize that this temporal double dissociation 
is explained by reward prediction errors. Finally a late, yet unreported reward-
sensitive ERP-topography (~500 ms) was identified. The sources of these 
topographical covariations are estimated in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the 
medial frontal gyrus, the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex and the 
hippocampus/amygdala. The results provide important new evidence regarding 
„how“, „when“ and „where“ the brain evaluates outcomes with different hedonic 
impact.  
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5.4.2 Introduction 
To optimize behavior, an organism needs to assess the experienced utility of actions 
or objects compared to its expected utility. The expected utility of a prospect is 
behaviorally inferred from revealed choices (Becker et al., 1964). On the other hand, 
the experienced utility, referring to the hedonic impact of an obtainment (Bentham, 
1798) is more difficult to objectively quantify as it represents a transient subjective 
state of emotion.  
Recent research using functional magnetic resonance imaging has identified neuronal 
structures that are involved in the evaluation of rewarding and punishing outcomes 
and therefore implicitly provide physiologically-based correlates of experienced 
utility and experienced regret (Knutson et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2003; 
D'Ardenne et al., 2008; Coricelli et al., 2007). Electroencephalography (EEG) studies 
revealed insights to the temporal course of outcome evaluation. Besides others, most 
prominently two event-related potentials (ERP) have been identified; the feedback 
error-related negativity (fERN) (Holroyd et al., 2003; Hajcak et al., 2005) and its 
pendant, the feedback correct-related positivity (fCRP) (Holroyd et al., 2008). The 
fERN-amplitude increases when outcomes are worse than expected, whereas the 
fCRP is more pronounced, when outcomes are better than expected. Consequently, 
the difference between the expectation and outcome is thought to define the 
experienced utility of the outcome (Yeung et al., 2005; Potts et al., 2006).  
Up to the here presented study it has not been investigated how different magnitudes 
of outcomes are related to the magnitude of global brain activity. From a logical point 
of view, neuronal activity elicited by stimuli solely differing in reward magnitude 
must reflect their hedonic impacts. Consequently, the quantification of the magnitude 
of brain responses of a reasonable sample of different rewards would enable to 
construct value functions for experienced utility in the case of gain and experienced 
regret in the case of omission. Value functions for experienced utility and regret may 
be of profound interest because they could help clarify why people sometimes fail to 
choose what maximizes their happiness (Hsee and Hastie, 2006). 
To derive such value functions, high-density EEG was recorded while subjects played 
a wheel-of-fortune game, during which they could win graded monetary rewards. In 
addition, we aimed to extend knowledge on electrophysiological responses to rewards 
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by circumventing common methodological issues: A majority of previous studies 
investigated only difference-waveforms between two conditions, like two magnitudes 
of outcomes. Hence, it is impossible to deduce the source of the variance (Luck, 
2005). Another potential drawback of the “classical” ERP approach is that waveforms 
are observed at a small number of beforehand selected electrodes. These electrodes 
are not representative for the underlying spatio-temporal distribution of brain activity 
(Murray et al., 2008). Extending the “classical” ERP approach, we investigated 
outcome related responses at the ERP-topography using the whole set of electrodes. 
With topographic EEG measures the full spatial and temporal information of EEG is 
available and thus can be used to estimate the intracerebral sources of EEG activity. 
Using this information, we delineated latency and localization of brain activity 
covarying (and not only differing) with reward value.  
 
5.4.3 Methods 
Subjects 
 
Sixteen healthy subjects (10 female, 6 male, mean age: 26.4 years (SD = 5.0)) were 
recruited at the University of Zurich. Subjects reported having no psychiatric 
conditions. The local ethics review committee approved the study. Subjects signed 
informed consent documents before the start of the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
 
Subjects were seated in 1 m distance from a computer screen (resolution: 1024 * 768 
pixel, screen size: 17’’) in a sound, light, and electrically shielded EEG recording 
room and played a wheel of fortune game (Fig. 1). 
 
On each trial of the experiment three coins were presented to the subjects. The sum of 
the three coins indicated the monetary reward value at stake. The reward value was 
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pseudo-randomly assigned, ranging from 10 Swiss centimes to 1 Swiss franc (" 0.75 
#). To assure visual similarity between the different monetary reward values, always 
three coins were presented with one or two visually scrambled coins, depending on 
the monetary value (for an example see Fig. 1).  
By pressing one of two buttons, subjects chose a color (green or red) to bet on. 
Depending on the chosen color, a rectangle surrounding the picture with the coins 
adapted its color accordingly. 500 ms after the button press a second rectangle, 
framed by the outer rectangle, started to alternate in coloring from red to green and 
back. The speed of alternation asymptotically decreased until the inner rectangle 
stopped after 3500 – 3800 ms. A trial was won, if the inner and outer rectangle 
matched color, increasing the actual balance of a subject for the amount of money 
played for. Whenever the color of the inner and outer rectangle was different, the 
money at stake was omitted. The time point of definite outcome was indicated 
through a white border of the inner rectangle. The picture indicating the outcome was 
presented for 1500 ms. The next trial started after the presentation (1000ms) of a 
blank screen with a fixation cross.  
 
Figure 1. Course of the experimental paradigm. A) Reward at stake is presented (e.g. 
50 Swiss centimes). B) Subject chooses color via button press. C) The inner rectangle 
starts alternating and stops after 3500-3800 ms. D) If the chosen color (outer 
rectangle) and the inner rectangle match, the subject wins. If the two rectangles are of 
different color, the potential reward is omitted. E) After the presentation of a blank 
screen for 1 second the next trial starts with a different reward value at stake.  
 
 
112 
In each of total 300 trials, a real monetary reward was at stake. Each reward value was 
played for 30 times, with a probability of 50% for gain and omission, resulting in a 
total monetary gain of 82.50 Swiss francs. Subjects were informed about the 
probability to win. Because the analysis (outlined below) is sensitive to unbalanced 
numbers of observations, we chose to pseudo-randomly predefine the sequences of 
outcomes of trials using randomized arrays obtained at www.random.org. 
Consequently, the 20 experimental conditions (reward value (10) x outcome (2)) were 
randomly distributed in time. There were 6 blocks of 50 trials for each subject 
presented in different random order. The subjects were truthfully told, that they could 
keep the money they won. Since the total gain was equal for all subjects, they were 
asked before the experiment whether they knew about any other participants and their 
gain. If a subject indicated to know of another’s gain, a different randomization 
procedure was available resulting in a similar gain (85 Swiss francs). None of the 
subjects indicated knowing about the monetary gains of others.  
 
EEG data acquisition and preprocessing 
 
Scalp EEG was recorded at 250 Hz with a Geodesics system (Electrical Geodesics, 
Inc., USA) from 129 scalp electrodes referenced to the vertex. Impedances were 
maintained at 30 k# or less. 21 electrodes located on the outermost circumference 
(chin and neck) were omitted, because the head model implemented in sLORETA 
(Pascual-Marqui, 2002), which was used to localize intracerebral sources, does not 
cover these electrodes. The remaining 109 electrodes were submitted to further 
analysis. The EEG was filtered offline from 1.5 to 30 Hz. Eye movement artifacts 
were removed from the data using independent component analysis (ICA). Trials 
containing further artifacts after visual inspection were excluded from the ERP 
analysis. EEG data was recomputed against the average reference. Artifact-free EEG 
epochs of 1200 ms were extracted with onsets 200 ms before the presentation of the 
outcome stimuli (Fig. 1 d). The average number of artifact-free data epochs from each 
subject was: 134.4 (of totally 150), SD = 15.2 for the rewarded outcomes and 132.0 
(of totally 150), SD = 16.2 for the omitted outcomes. ERP maps of each reward 
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condition were averaged for each subject, and grand-average ERPs across subjects 
were computed for each reward condition and across reward conditions. 
 
Definition of the time-window of analysis: Consistent ERP-topography across 
subjects 
 
To restrain the temporal window of analysis we followed a recently suggested 
approach (Koenig and Melie-Garcia, 2009, 2010) that detects the time periods in the 
ERP where similar intracortical generators are active across subjects. Since similar 
generators imply similar topographies, topographies across subjects are tested for 
consistency. For this test the Global Field Power (GFP) of the grand mean ERPs is 
taken as the measure of effect size. The null hypothesis states that for each time point 
the GFP of the grand mean ERP (i.e. the mean ERP across subjects of the mean ERPs 
within subjects) may be observed by chance. To test this hypothesis, the GFP of the 
grand mean ERP was compared to 5000 GFPs of the grand mean ERPs that were 
constructed by randomly shuffling the measurements across electrodes of the grand 
mean ERP within each subject. To obtain the probability of the null hypothesis, the 
percentage of cases was computed where the GFP obtained after randomization was 
larger than the GFP obtained in the observed data. This procedure was applied for 
grand means of won outcomes, lost outcomes and all outcomes.  
 
Topographic Analysis of Covariance (TANCOVA)  
 
Topographic analyses of covariance (TANCOVA) was used to identify the time 
points where the global scalp field potentials significantly covaried with the external 
variables. This method of analysis introduced by Koenig and colleagues (2008) relies 
on the fact that ERP fields are additive. Therefore, the existence of a source that is 
active proportionally to an external variable results in a single topography that is 
added to the ERP proportionally to the external variable. To retrieve the topography 
that is proportional to the external variable at a given point in time, the covariance of 
the external variable with the potentials at each electrode at that point in time is 
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computed. The obtained covariance map $ represents the map corresponding to the 
generators that activate proportionally to the external variable at the given point in 
time. Using the GFP of this covariance map as an effect size allows testing time-
frame for time-frame for significant covariation by applying randomization statistics 
as described in Koenig et al. (2008).   
For the time-windows indicating significant (p < 0.01) consistent scalp topographies 
across subjects, TANCOVAs were computed for the variables: reward value of gains 
(levels: 10), reward value of omitted outcomes (levels: 10) and valence (gains vs. 
omitted rewards) (levels: 2). Since it was not known whether reward value contributes 
linearly to the scalp field map, we tested different, monotonic functions to relate 
reward with the electrophysiological data with the goal of maximizing the 
correspondence of the actual reward value and the electrophysiological index of 
reward representation. Reward values xi were therefore transformed using a power 
function with parameter % (% < 1: concave function, % = 1: linear function, % > 1: 
convex function). 
 
xi '= xi" ,          1) 
where i is the reward level, and x is the reward (ranging from 0 to 1), and xi' is the 
covariate used for the computation of the covariance maps. % was varied in the range 
of 0.01 to 10 with increments of 0.1. For each subject and value of %,  covariance 
maps $ between the transformed reward values and the potentials at each electrode 
and each included point in time were computed as follows: 
,          2) 
where v is the scalp potential at electrode e, time-point t, and reward level i. These 
covariance maps were then used to compute, for each reward level, an 
electrophysiological index  of reward using the following equation (Koenig et al. 
2008): 
,         3) 
and where  is the mean of  across time. 
The correspondence between  and  was defined by the squared Pearson 
correlation coefficient r2 between the two vectors, which is equivalent to the percent 
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of common variance. The individual optimal % was defined at where this 
correspondence was maximal. In a next step, we assessed whether the r2 – values and 
%s’ of best fitting functions significantly differ from the corresponding r2 – values and 
a linear function (% = 1), using Wilcoxon-signed-rank-tests and paired t-tests, where 
appropriate. The median of the %-values of the best fitting functions entered the 
randomization test, described in the following section. To visually confirm the 
goodness of fit of the value functions, the values of  were plotted.  
According to Koenig et al. (2008) a randomization procedure (5000 iterations) was 
used to identify at which time points of the ERP the global scalp field potentials 
significantly covaried with the beforehand determined best fitting value function. 
Since this test calculates whether the ERP-topography covaries above chance level for 
each time-frame independently, the problem of multiple testing needs to be addressed. 
Following the same rationale of randomization statistics as for determining 
significance levels for each time-frame, we calculated whether the duration of a time-
window of continuous significant covariation might be observed by chance. Thus, the 
probability of a falsely detecting certain duration of a significant effect was computed. 
Details on this particular test are explicated by Koenig and Melie-Garcia (2009, 
2010). Results are reported with a threshold for significance of p < 0.01. For 
significant (p<0.01) time-windows the false positive probability of the duration (FPP-
D) is indicated. The whole analytical procedure was conducted for the won outcome 
conditions and the reward omission outcome conditions separately. Since the variable 
reward valence has only two levels and can be considered as a special case of a 
covariational analysis (with parameters of 1 for won and -1 for omission) (Koenig et 
al., 2008) the analysis steps of fitting the best function were unnecessary.   
 
Source localization 
 
Because the generated TANCOVA maps represent a linear transformation of the 
topographical data, they can directly be submitted to source localization procedures 
(Koenig et al., 2008). The inverse solution of the ERP-data was calculated using 
standardized low-resolution electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) 
(http://www.uzh.ch/keyinst/loreta.htm) (Pascual-Marqui, 2002). This method 
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computes the current density magnitude (A/mm2) of each voxel, localizing the neural 
generators of the electrical activity by assuming similar activation among neighboring 
neuronal clusters. The solution space was computed on a spherical head model with 
anatomical constraints (SMAC model, Spinelli et al., 2000) and comprised 3005 
solution points equidistantly distributed within the gray matter of the cerebral cortex 
and limbic structures of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 152 average brain. 
Anatomical labels are reported using an appropriate correction from Talairach-
Tournoux to MNI space (Brett et al., 2002). The obtained tomography represents the 
intracerebral generators of the scalp field data accounting for the effects observed in 
the external variable with the full spatial resolution of the measured data. The 
graphical rendering of intracerebral sources and the ERP-topographies was performed 
using the Cartool software (brainmapping.unige.ch/cartool) (Brunet et al., 2011). 
 
5.4.4 Results 
 
Behavioral results 
 
The behavioral task consisted of pseudo-randomly assigned gained and omitted 
rewards and the subjects were informed that the chance to win was 50 % throughout 
the experiment. Nevertheless we were interested how frequently subjects changed 
their choice of color to bet on, depending on the outcome and type of the previous 
trial. Results indicated no significant difference in the frequency of changing the 
choice for a color, neither depending on the value at stake (F(9,135)= 0.942; p < 0.491), 
nor on the outcomes (gain / loss) (F(1,15)= 0.262; p < 0.616), nor on the interaction of 
both (F(9,135)= 0.492; p < 0.878).  
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Consistent topography across subjects 
 
The test for consistent ERP topographies of the grand means across subjects revealed 
significant (p<0.01) consistency for a time-window from -100 ms to 564 ms (with the 
outcome as temporal reference), with an inconsistent time-window at 132-140 ms. It 
is noteworthy that such a short period of inconsistency within a larger time-window of 
consistent ERP topography typically occurs when ERP topographies change polarity, 
indicating that ERP sources are in transition to new stable states. The topography of 
the grand mean of gain-trials was consistent across subjects from -72 ms to 544 ms. 
Similarly, the grand mean ERP topography of all omission trials was consistent from -
112 ms to 568 ms, with inconsistent time-frames at 132 ms - 140 ms, 396 ms - 408 ms 
and 464 ms - 524 ms. The information of the obtained consistent time-frames was 
submitted to the proceeding analysis steps of reward value function estimation and the 
TANCOVA (Fig 3a). 
 
Estimation of Value Functions 
 
The value functions for gains and omissions were estimated subject-wise according to 
the criterion of the maximal sum of explained variance in the ERP-data during the 
time of consistent topography.  For both, gains and omissions convex functions fitted 
the ERP-data best (!gains: Mdn = 2.41, median absolute deviation (MAD) = 4.28; 
!!"#$$#!%& Mdn= 3.56, MAD =3.21) (see Fig. 2). Wilcoxon-signed-rank-tests indicated 
that %)7-''-)("differed significantly (Z=2.694, p<0.007) from"% " c"1 (linear function) 
and that there is a trend for a significant difference between"%gains (Z=1.890, p<0.059) 
and % "cX<"Furthermore, paired t-tests revealed that the functions with optimized %s' 
explain significantly more variance in the ERPs than linear functions (gains: 
T(15)=3.991; p<0.001; omission: : T(15)=4.238; p<0.001.) "
The model functions with optimized %’s explained on average 49.66% of variance in 
the omission ERPs during the time of consistent topography. For gains the functions 
with optimized %’s explained on average 49.86% of variance in the gain ERPs during 
the time of consistent topography.  
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Figure 2. Electroencephalographically derived value functions. Mean 
electrophysiological indices of reward ( , see equation 3 for details) as function of 
actual reward for the gain and omission conditions. Solid lines show the average 
across consistent time-frames and subjects and indicate a convex, non-linear relations 
between monetary rewards and ERP-responses. (Grey areas represent ± 1 standard 
error of the mean). The dotted lines illustrate the estimated value functions, which 
corresponded most closely to the exhibited ERP-responses and thus explained most 
variance in the data.  
 
Topographic Analysis of Covariance (TANCOVA)  
 
The TANCOVA on the variable valence revealed significantly (p < 0.01) covarying 
EEG topographies in the time-windows 268-304 ms (FPP-D ! 0.036) and 464-508 
ms (FPP-D ! 0.028) post outcome onset. Unexpectedly early (16ms after onset of 
outcomes to 40ms) there was a trend (p<0.05) for significantly differing ERP-
topographies with respect to valence. The p-value plot indicates that the p-value starts 
to decrease before the outcome of the game is presented, thus this effect cannot be the 
result of a physiological reaction to the valence of outcomes. The analysis further 
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indicated significant (p < 0.01) covariance for the variable reward value of won 
outcomes during the time period of 280ms – 296ms (FPP-D ! 0.056) and 484ms – 
504ms (FPP-D ! 0.038) post outcome onset. For reward values of omitted outcomes 
ERP-topographies indicated a trend (p < 0.05) for significant covariation with reward 
value during a time-window of 360ms – 380ms post outcome onset (Fig. 3b). Plots of 
the electrophysiological index of reward  as function of time and reward level (Fig. 
3c) should provide an insight on how the different reward levels contribute to the 
overall representation of reward across time.  
 
Source localization 
 
sLORETA was used to localize the intracranial generators of the ERP-covariance 
maps for each time point in the ERPs. The reported intracranial generators represent 
the averaged time-windows of significant covariance derived in the TANCOVA. 
Therefore, this approach revealed the relative contribution of intracranial sources 
covarying with the external variables. Overall, source localization revealed a neuronal 
network, which sensitively responds to information about rewarding (or disappointing 
in the case of omissions) outcomes that includes the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC), anterior and posterior cingulate cortex (ACC/PCC), the hippocampus and 
amygdala (Hipp/Amy) and the medial frontal gyrus (MFG).  
The point of maximal current source density (CSD) for valence during the time-
window 248ms to 312ms was found in VMPFC (MNI: x = -9, y = 42, z= -16). The 
time-window from 456ms to 520ms indicated maximal CSD in the right 
Hippocampus / Amygdala (MNI: x= 29, y = -12 z = -26). The covariance maps of 
value coding after gains at the time-windows of 268ms – 304ms revealed maximal 
CSD at the left MFG (MNI: x= -32, y= 8, z=60). For the time-window of 480ms – 
512ms highest CSD was found at the VMPFC (MNI: x=-3, y=35, z=-21). The 
covariance maps of value coding after omitted rewards at the time-window of 360ms 
– 380ms revealed maximal CSD at the right Hippocampus / Amygdala (MNI: x=29, 
y=-12, z=-26). (Fig. 3e).  
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Figure 3. Overview of ERP- Results. (a) Results of the topographic consistency test 
for all outcomes (first row), gains only (second row) and omissions (third row). Black 
areas indicate the significance level (inversely log-transformed) of the test. Areas 
exceeding the p<0.01 - mark restrict the time-window of the TANCOVA. The grey 
areas depicted within indicate the global-field power (GFP). b) Moment-by-moment 
significance level of the TANCOVA. The height of the area indicates the significance 
level (inversely log-transformed) of covariation between ERP-topographies and 
valence (first row), value of gains (second row) and value of omissions (third row). c) 
Plot of the electrophysiological index of reward   as function of time and reward 
level (see formula 3). d) Covariance maps of the ERP-data of the respective time-
frames of strong covariance. e) Source estimation of the covariance maps. The loci of 
maximal CSD (e.g. representing the maximal contribution to the covariance in the 
ERP-topography) are framed in red color. It is worth emphasizing that in all 
conditions similar sources differently contribute to the covariance at the level of the 
ERP-topography. 
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5.4.5 Discussion 
 
This study aimed to extend knowledge on reward processing by investigating ERP-
responses at the level of the EEG-topography. This approach offers several 
attractions: it combines the full spatial representation of EEG-data with a high time 
resolution and direct access to neuronal signaling. In addition, it is possible to collect 
a large number of trials within a short time. These factors made it possible to provide 
novel contributions to the understanding of “how”, “where” and “when” reward is 
processed. 
 
„How“ is monetary reward translated into brain activity? 
 
We determined the form of relation between ERP-topographies and associated 
monetary reward values. This functional form describes how the global response of 
brain activity is related to stimuli indicating gain and omission of different monetary 
rewards. Since we assured that these stimuli solely differed with respect to the 
magnitude of the outcome, it is conceivable that the response of brain activity 
(measured at the ERP-topography) corresponds to the experienced utility or regret of 
a more or less favorable outcome. Contrary to our expectations, the results revealed 
convex value functions for gains and omissions. Therefore, the sensitivity of the 
electrophysiological response nonlinearly increased for larger values. This finding is 
in contrast to concave utility functions derived from revealed choices (decision utility) 
and stimulus-intensity coding functions, following the psychophysics of diminishing 
sensitivity (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). It is possible that the discrepancy between 
the value functions is due to the low monetary values at stake in our experiment. 
However, as reported for value functions of decision utility, it is assumable that value 
functions for experienced utility might not change with rising stakes (Fehr-Duda et 
al., 2010). In addition, it has been shown that reward value is neuronally coded in 
relation to possible outcomes and not at an absolute scale (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; 
Tobler et al., 2005; Elliott et al., 2008; De Martino et al., 2009; Fujiwara et al., 2009). 
New experiments are called for to examine the robustness of this unforeseen result; 
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this allowing to propose conscientious psychological interpretations of value 
functions for experienced utility and experienced regret. 
 
“Where” is value and valence processed? 
 
Source solutions revealed a network of brain areas, which sensitively responded to 
information about rewarding (or disappointing) outcomes that includes the VMPFC, 
ACC/PCC, hippocampus/amygdala and MFG. Interestingly, the characteristic 
topographies of covariance of the specific time-windows and conditions seems not to 
result from structurally dissociable neuronal processes as previously suggested 
(Yacubian et al., 2006, Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Instead, it seems that a common 
network is involved in the processing of distinct aspects of reward information; the 
components are differentially engaged depending on the specific step in processing.  
 
For example, the VMPFC responds sensitively to the valence of the outcome and the 
value of gains but to a lesser extent to the value of omissions. This is in line with 
previous studies, showing that activity in the VMPFC increases after rewarding 
outcomes compared to omissions (Knutson et al., 2003) and is correlated with 
experienced value (Smith et al., 2010) and pleasantness ratings (Lebreton et al., 
2009). In addition, the MFG predominantly responded to information about value but 
scarcely to valence. This conforms to linear increasing activity with the reward value 
of gains (Elliott et al., 2003). The source solution indicated most prominent (but not 
exclusive) omission-sensitive activity in the hippocampus in vicinity to the amygdala. 
The potential involvement of the amygdala replicates previous results showing that 
the amygdala encodes negative prediction errors (e.g. worse than expected outcomes) 
(Yacubian et al., 2006), but also responds to rewards (Breiter et. al., 2001) and is 
generally believed to encode the emotional significance of stimuli, be it appetitive or 
aversive (Shabel and Janak, 2009). Similarly – besides the processing of mnemonic 
functions – the observation of reward dependent variation of activity in the 
hippocampus is compatible with the key role played by this structure in reward and 
emotion (Blood and Zatorre, 2001). 
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We are aware that the precision of the EEG-source localization is limited and it likely 
cannot distinguish activity, for example, in the amygdala from hippocampal activity. 
Nevertheless, at a more general level it has been shown that medial-temporal activity 
or activity in the VMPFC (or orbitofrontal cortex) can be reliably retrieved from scalp 
EEG using similar source reconstruction techniques as in our study (Lantz et al., 
1997, 2001; Zumsteg et al., 2005; Pizzagalli et al., 2003).  
 
“When” is reward information processed?  
 
The results indicate that at a first stage (~250 - 300 ms post-outcome) two factors of 
outcomes are processed; a coarse evaluation along a good - bad dimension (valence) 
and a concurrent, finer grained evaluation of positive outcomes (value). The value of 
omitted rewards covaried with the ERP-topography at a greater latency (~360 ms 
post-outcome). Importantly, during this time-window ERP-topographies did not differ 
with respect to the valence of outcomes. The results therefore revealed a concurrent 
processing of valence and value of gained rewards and a later processing of omitted 
reward values.  
We conjecture that this scheme of brain responses may be driven through cortical 
input of midbrain reward prediction error (RPE) signals. Seminal experiments of 
Wolfram Schultz and colleagues have shown that for rewards at chance a positive 
RPE is generated, which is represented by a phasic increase in spiking activity 
(Schultz et al., 1997). This increase is scaled to the value of gained rewards (Fiorillo 
et al., 2003; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005). It was demonstrated that these phasic 
fluctuations of dopaminergic midbrain activity modulate activity in the ACC (Holroyd 
and Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2003). Furthermore, in line with our results, several 
studies revealed that the dopaminergic midbrain is effectively connected (besides 
others) with the VMPFC, MFG and hippocampus/amygdala (for a review, see Camara 
et al., 2009). In the case of the omission of a reward, a depression in spiking activity 
typically follows (Schultz et al., 1997). Therefore, the difference between the 
depression and any scaled increase of spikes makes it possible that valence and value 
of gains are concurrently encoded.  
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For scaled negative RPEs’ (e.g. modulated through omitted rewards of different 
magnitude) the quantification of spike depression appears to be limited (Fiorillo et al., 
2003), because the range of the spiking rate of dopaminergic midbrain neurons from 
the baseline rate (3–8 spikes per second) (Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008) to zero spiking 
is marginal. This might explain why the value of omitted rewards is not processed at 
the same time as value of gains in the present study.  
However, it has been suggested that scaled negative RPEs’ are coded by means of the 
duration of the pauses in spiking (Bayer et al., 2007). Consequently, it only makes 
sense to pass the information about the value of negative RPEs from midbrain 
structures to higher cognitive processing after the full expiration of the pause. In line 
with this, omitted reward values in this study significantly covaried with the ERP-
topography ~110 ms after the first significant effect of valence coding.  
Although we were exploring measures at the level of the ERP-topography, by and 
large our results are supported through findings of research focusing on ERP 
responses of individual electrodes (Hajcak et al., 2005; Potts et al., 2006; Hewig et al., 
2008; Holroyd et al., 2008; San Martin et al., 2010). For example, underpinning the 
hypothesis of a dopaminergically driven ERP-topographies, Cohen et al., (2007) 
showed that during a time-window in the range of the first processing of valence and 
value of gains, power and phase coherence values of ERPs following wins but not 
losses were modulated by reward probability, which - like reward value - modulates 
the magnitude of RPEs. Regarding the omission-sensitive ERP-topography, previous 
studies reported, that the amplitude of the (highly similar in terms of topography and 
latency) P300 reflects a pure coding of value irrespective of valence in the P300 
component (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Sato et al., 2005), whereas others indicated that 
the P300 is sensitive to valence and value (Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd and 
Krigolson, 2007; Wu and Zhou, 2009).  
Besides the above-discussed results, which are within the temporal range of 
previously reported feedback related ERPs, the ERP-topography in a later time-
window (~ 470 ms post feedback) significantly varied due to valence and value 
differences of the gains. Again the ERP-topography did not reflect an influence of the 
value of omitted rewards. The processing of valence and value of gains similarly 
involved the VMPFC and Hippocampus/Amygdala. Activity in the VMPFC more 
strongly covaried with the value of gains, whereas activity in the Hipp/Amy exhibited 
the strongest source of valence-dependent variation. The finding of a later, yet not 
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reported reward sensitive ERP-topography demonstrates one of the key advantages of 
our analysis approach, namely the a-priori unrestrained analysis of all electrodes and 
time-points of the post-outcome epoch.  
To conclude, the present results demonstrate a measure of experienced utility by 
means of brain activity. In addition, ERP-responses to different aspects of reward 
information recruit similar but differently weighted neuronal structures in a specific 
temporal sequence. The time-course of processing argues in favor of 
dopaminergically-driven activity. 
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6 General Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to identify the neuronal structures responding to 
the degree of preference for one out of three desired brands. A further aim of this 
study was to examine whether the modulation of neural activity by the intensity of 
brand attractiveness was evident in distinct neural networks during the anticipation of 
the desired objects and during the evaluation of the receipt of these objects.  
To reach these goals, the study used a wheel-of-fortune game comprising an 
anticipation phase and a subsequent outcome evaluation phase. Inside a 3 Tesla MRI 
scanner, participants played for chocolate bars of three different brands that differed 
in subjective attractiveness.  
The results of this experiment suggest a graded effect of differently preferred brands 
onto the incentive value of objectively equivalent rewards. Contrary to the winner-
take-all hypothesis (Deppe et al., 2005), neural activity is linearly associated with the 
subjective brand preference hierarchy. This is in line with studies using objectively 
varied amounts of money as rewards. Furthermore, the study identifies distinct brand-
preference-modulated areas to be active during anticipation and outcome phases.  
During the anticipation phase, hemodynamic responses in the left premotor cortex and 
anterior insula increase in correspondence to brand preferences. These regions of the 
brain have been associated with motor preparedness (Deiber et al., 1996) and somatic 
and emotional arousal (Critchley et al., 2000). The activation of a cluster in the 
(dopaminergic) midbrain possibly affects this increase in arousal, sensorimotor 
readiness and increased attention (Berridge, 2007). 
In the ensuing outcome phase, while participants evaluate the positive game outcome, 
a distinct neural network commonly associated with attentional processes, 
sympathetic arousal, and cognitive-emotional evaluation of rewards exhibits 
preference-modulated activity. In particular, the ventral pallidum (VP) shows 
preference-sensitive activation. This is in line with previous studys that describe the 
VP as a central relay station for the distributed brain circuit of core liking (Knutson et 
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al., 2001b; Tindell et al., 2006), as well as a potential relay station to cortical systems 
of conscious pleasure.  
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find preference-related activity in the ventral 
striatum (VS), the medial orbitofrontal cortex (MOFC) and the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). This may be due to several reasons. First, fMRI signals in 
the VS and the OFC are prone to susceptibility artefacts. Because these inferior 
structures lie close to cavities filled with air, the surrounding magnetic field yields 
inhomogeinities resulting in signal loss. It is therefore conceivable that fMRI did not 
reliably capture activity in these regions. Secondly, with regards to the experimental 
paradigm, to win meant to receive a delayed reward, which was only symbolic at the 
very moment. Gregorios-Pippas et al., (2009) show that activity in the VS is reduced, 
when subjects face rewards in the future compared to instant rewards. As a third 
reason, the properties of the reward scheme might explain the lack of activation in 
prominent reward-structures like the VS, MOFC and VMPFC: Participants could lose 
a once gained reward in any subsequent trial. Therefore, the expected reward value 
and consequently VS activity decreases because for a specific gained reward the 
probability to keep it over the whole experiment is small. Supporting this notion, a 
recent fMRI study demonstrates that neural activity in the ventral striatum correlates 
with the expected probability for a reward and therefore decreases for small 
probabilities (Abler et al., 2006). 
In summary, the study suggest that neural activation in reward processing structures is 
modulated by stimuli varying in subjective reward intensity. Furthermore, we show 
that fMRI makes it possible to depict even small differences in preference. As a 
consequence, the question arises whether fMRI may be directly applicable in 
marketing research. The greatest factor arguing against widely applied fMRI based 
screenings is obviously the cost, which reflects a multiple compared to classical 
market-research screenings. Furthermore, fMRI is limited to a restricted group of 
subjects that have no metallic implants, cardiac pacemakers, and are not pregnant. In 
addition, fMRI is very noisy and aggravating for subjects, challenging valid measures 
of, for example, emotional responses to products. We suggest an alternative approach 
that uses fMRI to cross-validate market-research instruments. This validation 
approach is not part of this thesis, but a comprehensive introduction is given by Lutz 
Jäncke & Raimund Wildner, (2010) 
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The primary goal of the follow-up Experiment 2 was to replicate and strengthen the 
findings of the Experiment 1.Another key question was, whether the observed effects 
of brand preference on neuronal activity would generalize across different reward 
categories.  
Due to the lack of finding of VS, OFC and VMPFC activity in Experiment 1, we 
decided to adapt the experimental paradigm with respect to the reward scheme. This 
time, participants could increase reward probabilities rather than gain (as well as lose) 
rewards. Again, a wheel-of-fortune game comprising an anticipation phase and a 
subsequent outcome phase was implemented. Participants played for vouchers for 
sneakers of three different brands that differed in subjective attractiveness. 
We also tried to circumvent the problem of singal loss in inferior structures by 
modifiying the fMRI scanning sequence. To improve signal-to-noise ratios in these 
areas, the field-of-view was tilted with an angle of 30° with respect to the AC-PC line 
(Deichmann et al., 2003).  
Overall, the analysis inferred similar structures, suggesting reliable activation of 
reward related-brain structures to differentially valued rewards. In line with 
Experiment 1, the data indicate that playing for more preferred rewards compared to 
less preferred rewards induces increased neural activation in structures commonly 
linked to reward processing. Results furthermore suggest the proposed distinction 
between anticipatory and evaluative aspects of reward processing (Knutson et al., 
2001b). Thus, the observed effects seem to generalize across different reward 
categories. In addition, the study shows that increasing the subjects’ chance of 
obtaining a reward elicits neural activity comparable to winning primary reinforcers 
or accumulating monetary rewards. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, activity in the VS and the MPFC correlates with the 
individual preferences for the sneaker brands. This difference in activity patterns 
between the experiments demonstrates that only minor changes the experimental 
design may greatly influence results of fMRI experiments. This highlights the 
necessity to use fMRI as a hypothesis driven method instead of post ex facto “brain 
reading”. 
The second part of Experiment 2 investigates the characteristics of the 
hemodynamic response patterns in the VS, using a different analysis approach. 
Several earlier studies show that dopaminergic midbrain neurons of monkeys and 
fMRI activity in the human VS encode largely similar aspects of rewards. We 
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therefore aimed to test whether dopaminergic midbrain firing patterns reported in a 
recent sinlge cell primate study of Tobler et al. (2005) could predict the characteristic 
fMRI responses of the VS. Secondly, we sought to investigate whether the effect of 
reward value “gain-adaptation” in dopamine neurons, reported in same study, is also 
evident at the level of the VS in humans.  
Results indicate that hemodynamic responses in the VS largely follow the predictions 
of dopaminergic midbrain responses in monkeys. In agreement with Tobler et al.’s 
(2005) findings, activity in the VS increases as a function of reward magnitude during 
the expectation of future rewards. Furthermore, fMRI activity increases after gaining 
rewards, though independently of reward magnitude. This reward magnitude 
insensitive response is in line with the reported effect of reward prediction error 
“gain-adaptation” (Tobler et al., 2005). Taking the congruencies between activity in 
the dopaminergic midbrain and VS into account, it seems reasonable to hypothesize 
that midbrain dopamine activity largely influences activity in the VS and vice versa. 
However, hemodynamic responses in the VS after the omission of rewards do reflect 
the magnitude of the missed rewards. This finding contradicts the observed 
magnitude-indifferent (due to “gain-adaptation”) dopaminergic midbrain activity in 
response to reward omission in non-human primates. Therefore, the partly rejection of 
the hypothesis of dopaminergic midbrain – VS interaction induces, that after the 
omission of rewards, the VS receives different than the dopaminergic midbrain input. 
We explored possible modulatory sources of the graded negative response in the VS 
using a psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI). The PPI reveales that a cluster 
in the brainstem, in vicinity of the dorsal raphe nucleus (dRN), a cluster in the lateral 
OFC and the ACC changes their effective connectivity to the VS. Single cell 
recording studies of non-human primates show, that the dRN inhibits dopaminergic 
function in many terminal fields such as the striatum (Kapur and Remington, 1996). 
Daw et al., (2002) suggests that serotonin may act as an opponent to dopamine. It is 
therefore conceivable that the serotonergic dRN down-regulates dopamine release in 
the VS. Also, the OFC is predestined to influence activity in the VS. The lateral OFC 
is widely interconnected to sensory structures within the brain (Padoa-Schioppa and 
Assad, 2006) and is active during the evaluation of punishing stimuli (Kringelbach, 
2005). Furthermore, the VS receives major projections from the lateral OFC (Haber et 
al., 1995). It is consequently likely that the lateral OFC evaluates sensory information 
about a punishing event which subsequently down-regulates activity in the VS. The 
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ACC is possible not down-regulating activity in the VS, but is itself up regulated 
through decreased activity in the VS. The ACC receives strong inhibitory input from 
dopaminergic structures, which supports the stated interpretation. Consequently, when 
the outcome of an event is worse than expected, pyramidal cells in the ACC are 
disinhibited, resulting in the well explored event-related potential (ERP), termed the 
error related negativity (ERN) or feedback error related negativity (FRN) in 
electroencephalograms (EEG) (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Thus, a highly preferred 
reward that is not obtained represents a more relevant violation of expectancy than the 
omission of a less preferred reward. Neurons in the ACC may process this violation 
and trigger the subsequent (re)formation of future expectations.  
A third study further investigates the evaluation of rewarding outcomes, using the 
method of EEG. EEG tracks electrophysiological changes elicited through brain 
activity in a range of milliseconds. With state-of-the-art high-density electrode arrays 
it is possible to localize intracortical generators with a precision of a few cubic 
centimetres. However, common practice of EEG analyses often only examine single 
electrodes within a predefined time-window of interest, which renders a poor 
(univariate) representation of multivariate data. The aim of Experiment 3 was to 
determine at which time-windows after feedback about rewards ERP topographies 
covary significantly with reward values of gained and omitted rewards. Taking this 
approach, we use the full spatial and temporal properties of the EEG data. In addition, 
we propose a new method to indicate the nature of relationship between the EEG 
signals and reward magnitudes, therefore providing a psychophysiology-based value 
function for money.  
In Experiment 3 subjects gambled for different amounts of money ranging from 10 
Swiss centimes to 1 Swiss franc in decrements of 10 centimes.  
Results indicate that the feedback about the outcome of the gambles is first evaluated 
with respect to the valence (gain vs. omission) within a time range of the feedback 
related negativity (FRN). Within this time-window (250 – 300ms post outcome) ERP 
topographies vary also in relation to the value of gains, suggesting a finer grained 
evaluation. The cerebral sources accounting for the effects on the scalp topography 
are localized within the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). The evaluation of the value 
of omitted rewards is observable 370ms post outcome and yields an overlapping but 
slightly more frontal intracerebral source.  
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This asymmetric processing of gained and omitted reward values can be explained in 
view of the dopamine reward prediction error theory. According to Schultz et al., 
(1997) for rewards at chance a positive prediction error is generated, which is 
represented by a phasic increase in spiking activity in dopamine neurons. This 
increase scales to the reward value (Bayer et al., 2007) and might therefore account 
for the covariation of EEG topographies and gained reward values. In contrast, the 
study of Bayer et al., (2007) reveales that negative reward prediction errors scale to 
the value of missed rewards with respect to the duration of the pause in spiking. This 
explains the later covarying ERP-topography for omitted reward values, since the 
information about the value of the omitted reward is only available after the 
expiration of the pause.  
Using a novel analysis approach, we additionally infer from the experimental data in 
what relation reward value and EEG maps covary. We observe for gains as well as 
omitted rewards convex functions. This indicates that the sensitivity of the EEG 
response disproportionally increases for larger values. This finding is in contrast to 
behaviourally derived value functions, commonly exhibiting the psychophysics of 
diminishing sensitivity. We believe that the low range of monetary values at stake 
causes this discrepancy. Therefore the results cannot be generalized to monetary value 
functions of greater values. However, using a modified reward scheme should render 
such a generalization. 
The findings of later, yet not reported, reward sensitive EEG topographies 
demonstrate one of the key advantages of the presented analysis approach: It offers 
the possibility of a-priori unrestrained analyses of all electrodes and time-points.  
Regarding the results of the conducted experiments and other studies as a whole, it 
appears that the dopamine system is always involved as a root. This system handles 
the processing of a vast variety of rewards using simple computational rules. It is 
fascinating that essentially the same neuronal mechanisms as found, for instance, in 
the brain of a rat also enable humans to make decisions in a complex world. For 
example, the decision-making involved in the stock market investments likely 
employs the same basic mechanisms as the ones needed by a neanderthaler thousands 
of years ago, walking through the forest and deciding to pick berries or hunt animals. 
Neuronal structures like the VS, VMPFC, and midbrain dopamine areas may be 
regarded as “reward-gauges”. Correlating neuronal activity in these areas with 
behavioural measures offers the opportunity to obtain objective measures of incentive 
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and hedonic valuation. Consequently, modern neuroimaging techniques provide 
insight in motivational behaviour, decision-making but also addictive behaviour at an 
introspective-independent level. 
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